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THE CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITY OF WARRANTLESS
NSA SURVEILLANCE:  THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND
THE INJURY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Robert Bloom  & William J. Dunn* **
ABSTRACT
In the past year, there have been many revelations about the tactics used by the
Bush administration to prosecute its war on terrorism.  These stories involve the exploi-
tation of technologies that allow the government, with the cooperation of phone compa-
nies and financial institutions, to access phone and financial records.  This Article fo-
cuses on the revelation and widespread criticism of the Bush administration’s operation
of a warrantless electronic surveillance program to monitor international phone calls
and e-mails that originate or terminate with a United States party.  The powerful and
secret National Security Agency heads the program and leverages its significant
intelligence collection infrastructure to further this effort.  Fueling the controversy are
undeniable similarities between the current surveillance program and the improper use
of electronic surveillance that was listed as an article of impeachment for former
President Richard M. Nixon.  President Bush argues that the surveillance program
passes constitutional inquiry based upon his constitutionally delegated war and foreign
policy powers, as well as the congressional joint resolution passed following the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  These arguments fail to supersede the explicit and
exhaustive statutory framework provided by Congress and amended repeatedly since
2001 for judicial approval and authorization for electronic surveillance.  The specific
regulation by Congress based upon war powers shared concurrently with the President
provides a constitutional requirement that cannot be bypassed or ignored by the
President.  The President’s choice to do so violates the Constitution and risks the defi-
nite sacrifice of individual rights for speculative gain from warrantless action.
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President’s Remarks in a Discussion on the PATRIOT Act in Buffalo, N.Y., 40 WEEKLY1
COM P. PRES. DOC. 638, 641 (Apr. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Apr. 20, 2004 Remarks].
Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, American Bar Association, to President2
George W. Bush (Feb. 13, 2006) (on file with American Bar Association), http://www.abanet
.org/op/greco/memos/aba_donsurv_ltr_whthouse-0206.pdf.
The President’s News Conference (Dec. 19, 2005), 41 W EEKLY COM P. PRES. DOC.3
1885, 1885 (Dec. 26, 2005) [hereinafter Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference]. It should be noted that
these revelations focused on international calls and e-mails in which one party to the communi-
cation was in the United States. Since this press conference, additional revelations with regard
to the collection of phone call records have been reported. See, e.g., Leslie Cauley, NSA
Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA  TODAY , May 11, 2006, at 1A.
The President’s News Conference (Jan. 26, 2006), 42 WEEKLY COM P. PRES. DOC. 125,4
131 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 26, 2006 Press Conference].
David Frost, Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina5
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1977, at A16. Nixon justified the illegal nature of his authorized acti-
vities by appealing to presidential war powers. He stated, after referencing Abraham Lincoln’s
belief in the presidential power to take unconstitutional actions to preserve the nation, that
it has been . . . argued that as far as a President is concerned, that in war
When we’re talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking
about getting a court order before we do so.
—President George W. Bush1
We join with you in the conviction that terrorism must be fought
with the utmost vigor, but we also believe we must ensure this fight
is conducted in a manner reflective of the highest American values.
—Michael S. Greco2
INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush responded to revelations that his administration con-
ducted warrantless electronic surveillance of American citizens by stating, “As Presi-
dent and Commander in Chief, I have the constitutional responsibility and the con-
stitutional authority to protect our country. . . .  So, consistent with U.S. law and the
Constitution, I authorized the interception of international communications of people
with known links to Al Qaida . . . .”   President Bush attempted to defend this statement3
one month later by stating, “[O]ther Presidents have used the same authority I’ve had,
to use technology to protect the American people.”   This latter statement is certainly4
accurate, though its truth is both eerie and unsettling.  Most notably, the argument that
authorization for the warrantless surveillance is provided directly from the consti-
tutional powers granted to the President harkens back to President Richard M. Nixon’s
statement that, “It’s quite obvious that there are certain inherently government activities,
which, if undertaken by the sovereign in protection of the interests of the nation’s
security are lawful, but which if undertaken by private persons, are not.”5
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time, a President does have certain extraordinary powers which would
make acts that would otherwise be unlawful, lawful if undertaken for
the purpose of preserving the nation and the Constitution, which is
essential for the rights we’re all talking about.
Id.
See id.; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.6
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1. The revelation of President Bush’s warrantless electronic surveil-
lance and blatant disregard of the requirements provided by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act reportedly prompted United States District Judge James Robertson, a judge on the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, to resign. Brian Knowlton, Judge Quits Intelligence Court; Action
Linked to Concern over U.S. Spying Without Warrants, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2005, at 5.
See Huston Plan: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental7
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Huston Plan
Hearings] (statement of Sen. Frank Church, Chairman, S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities). In addition, the assassination of President John
F. Kennedy led the Secret Service to task the National Security Agency (NSA) with the collection
of information under the national security justification of presidential protection. The National
Security Agency and Fourth Amendment Rights: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm.
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. 11 (1975)
[hereinafter Church Hearings] (statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., Director, NSA).
See Huston Plan Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.8
See id.9
See id.; Frost, supra note 5. The Huston Plan was named after Deputy White House10
Counsel Tom Huston. Id.
Frost, supra note 5.11
The comparison between the actions taken by President George W. Bush and
Richard M. Nixon are not merely academic but are unnervingly similar in substance,
scope, and perceived authority.  Both included warrantless electronic surveillance
of American citizens.  Both were justified by the relative administrations through
an appeal to national security imperatives.  Both resulted in public outcry and con-
gressional inquiry.6
President Nixon acted in the context of a nation transfixed with the war in
Vietnam.   While the nation fixated on the deaths of over 50,000 Americans, President7
Nixon was preoccupied with the massive domestic protests that swept the country.8
President Nixon believed that these protests were initiated by foreign elements.9
To combat this national security threat, President Nixon launched a coordinated
intelligence-gathering plan later named the Huston Plan.   The Huston Plan “advo-10
cated the systematic use of wiretappings, burglaries, or so-called black bag jobs,
mail openings and infiltration against antiwar groups and others.”   Though the Huston11
Plan itself lasted only five days before FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover terminated it,
President Nixon’s approval of the plan, despite his explicit awareness of its illegality,
was listed in the Articles of Impeachment and cited by the Senate Select Committee
to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church
Committee) in 1975 as “only an episode in the lawlessness which preceded and fol-
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Huston Plan Hearings, supra note 7, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Frank Church); see also12
Frost, supra note 5. The Church Committee received its name from Senator Frank Church
of Idaho who chaired the select committee. Church Hearings, supra note 7, at ii.
See S. COMM . TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE13
ACTIVITIES, INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS OF AM ERICANS, S. REP. NO . 94–755,
bk. 2, at 7 (1976); Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian Fourth
Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 103 (2006); Walter F. Mondale, Keeping Faith
in the Rule of Law, 63 BENCH &  BAR OF M INN . 26 (2006).
See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 35–36 (statement by Sen. Walter Mondale,14
Member, S. Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities).
Id. at 36.15
Id.16
See id.17
See id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.18
See Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1885.19
lowed its brief existence.”   The Church Committee would unearth FBI surveillance12
of private citizens and of members of antiwar and civil rights groups, including
Martin Luther King, Jr.   The works of this committee resulted in the passage of the13
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
The Church Committee convened to address the Huston Plan and other unnerving
intelligence community activities.  One of the primary concerns expressed by Senator
Mondale was the lack of Congressional guidelines that defined and controlled agencies
such as the National Security Agency (NSA).   He noted during hearings with the14
director of the NSA, Lt. General Lew Allen, that only executive branch directives
guided NSA operations.   These directives were based on policy and not law.   The15 16
lack of law controlling the NSA bothered Senator Mondale and led him to challenge
Lt. General Allen with the following concern:
Given another day and another President, another perceived risk
and someone breathing hot down the neck of the military leader
then in charge of the NSA; demanding a review based on another
watch list, another wide sweep to determine whether some of the
domestic dissent is really foreign based, my concern is whether
that pressure could be resisted on the basis of the law or not.17
Senator Mondale’s concern not only speaks to the motive behind the passage of
FISA, but it also was predictive of the post-September 11 surveillance.   In the wake of18
the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., President Bush sought to
increase the intelligence community’s ability to prevent future attacks by Al Qaida.   In19
an effort to achieve this goal, President Bush authorized the NSA to conduct electronic
surveillance on hundreds, maybe thousands, of Americans without employing the
traditional warrant process or the congressionally created foreign intelligence warrant
mechanism codified by FISA—the very act that Congress passed in 1978 after the
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See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.20
See id.21
H.R. JUDICIARY COMM ., IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON , PRESIDENT OF THE22
UNITED STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 93–1305, art. 2, § 2, at 146 (1974) (The articles of impeachment
were never voted on by the entire House of Representatives due to Richard Nixon’s resignation).
In response to a question that asked how the activities sanctioned by President Nixon dif-23
fered from the current NSA surveillance, President Bush first refused to draw a distinction,
stating instead that Presidents have this power in wartime. Only after this comment did President
Bush argue that Congress had given implicit support and authority through the Authorization for
Use of Military Force joint resolution in 2001. See Jan. 26, 2006 Press Conference, supra note
4, at 131. It should be noted, however, that not all Bush administration lawyers agreed with this
surveillance. In fact, many lawyers, including the former Deputy Attorney General James
Comey, vigorously opposed the NSA surveillance. Daniel Klaidman et al., Palace Revolt,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 2006, at 35.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES24
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT (2006) [hereinafter
DOJ WHITE PAPER].
Id. at 6–10.25
Watergate Scandal unearthed President Nixon’s illicit NSA surveillance.   The full20
details of President Bush’s 2002 authorization for electronic surveillance of
Americans remain to be disclosed, but the surreptitious nature of surveillance, the
targeting of American citizens, and the apparent disregard for Fourth Amendment
principles are known and draw undeniable similarities to actions by President Nixon.21
It is interesting to note that Article II of the Articles of Impeachment of Richard M.
Nixon specifically states:
He Misused the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service,
and Other Executive Personnel, in Violation or Disregard of the
Constitutional Rights of Citizens, by Directing or Authorizing Such
Agencies or Personnel to Conduct or Continue Electronic Surveil-
lance or Other Investigations for Purposes Unrelated to National Se-
curity, the Enforcement of Laws, or Any Other Lawful Function of
His Office; He Did Direct, Authorize, or Permit the Use of Informa-
tion Obtained Thereby for Purposes Unrelated to National Security,
the Enforcement of Laws or Any Other Lawful Function of His Of-
fice; and He Did Direct the Concealment of Certain Records Made
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Electronic Surveillance.22
Interestingly, the Bush administration does not directly refute the accuracy or
appropriateness of the analogy to President Nixon’s activities.   Instead, the Bush23
administration argues that nearly every applicable Fourth Amendment and presidential
power theory supports the permissibility of the program.   Specifically, President Bush24
argues that the Constitution grants the President the inherent power to conduct the
electronic surveillance at issue.   In addition, he argues that Congress affirmed this25
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Id. at 10–13.26
Id. at 17–28, 36–41.27
It should be noted that this article is only addressing the NSA program that involved28
listening to international calls and reading international e-mails, not the program involving
the obtaining of domestic phone records.
See infra notes 36–94 and accompanying text.29
See infra notes 95–115 and accompanying text.30
See infra notes 116–72 and accompanying text.31
See infra notes 173–215 and accompanying text.32
See infra notes 216–44 and accompanying text.33
See infra notes 245–382 and accompanying text.34
See infra notes 383–480 and accompanying text.35
See JAM ES BAMFORD , THE PUZZLE PALACE: A  REPORT ON AM ERICA’S MOST SECRET36
AGENCY  1, 281 (1982); Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6. Senator Church noted during the
Church Committee Hearings in 1975 that the NSA remained unknown to most Americans
at that time, both in name and in acronym. Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.
See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 1.37
power through the passage of the joint resolution authorizing force in Afghanistan
following the September 11 terrorist attacks.   Finally, he argues that the manner and26
method of the warrantless surveillance comports with both the requirements of FISA
and the demands of the Fourth Amendment.27
This Article discusses why each of the arguments put forth by the Bush admin-
istration fails to justify the warrantless surveillance under both statutory and consti-
tutional demands.   Part I explores the function and capabilities of the NSA, and why28
those capabilities are a cause for concern.   Part II discusses the relationship be-29
tween FISA and Congress’s regulation of electronic surveillance for domestic crime
control through Title III  and provides a brief description of the key aspects of the30
FISA court order process and its three major exceptions.   Part III explains the31
authority granted by the Authorization for Use of Military Force passed by Congress
in 2001 through a joint resolution,  as well as the subsequent amendments to FISA.32 33
Part IV argues that the NSA surveillance program is constitutionally impermissible
under FISA’s statutory framework because the President has no relevant constitutional
power to authorize warrantless surveillance.   Finally, Part V argues that the NSA34
surveillance program violates the Fourth Amendment.35
I. THE FUNCTION AND CAPABILITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
At the core of the recent electronic surveillance controversy is the NSA—a large,
secretive, and powerful agency.  President Truman’s initial establishment of the
agency in 1952, its subsequent operations, and even its modern capabilities exist
under a shroud of secrecy once so thick that the organization’s nickname became
“No Such Agency.”   The NSA maintained and managed a large infrastructure36
footprint, but its legal authority remained scarce.   No congressional statute created the37
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Id.38
Id.39
David Ensor, Brave New World: Agency’s Challenges More Complex in Post-Cold War40
Era, CNN.COM, Mar. 19, 2001, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/nsa/stories/codebreakers/
index.html; FAS.org, Tracing the Rise and Fall of Intelligence Spending, http://www.fas.org/
irp/budget/index.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2006).
See U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Directive No. 5100.20, ¶ 2.2 (Dec. 23, 1971) (as amended41
through June 24, 1991), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d510020p
.pdf [hereinafter Directive No. 5100.20]; FAS.org, SIGINT Overview, Mar. 9, 1997, http://
www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/overview.htm.
See Directive No. 5100.20, supra note 41, ¶ 3.1.42
See Ensor, supra note 40.43
Id. The U.S. Army Security Agency initially operated Menwith Hill Station when it44
officially, though secretly, opened on September 15, 1960. See BAMFORD , supra note 36, at
208. The base provided an environment free from urban electromagnetic interference, which
made it ideal for electronic surveillance. Id. at 209. The NSA took over the operations of
Menwith Hill on August 1, 1966. Id.
60 Minutes: ECHELON; Worldwide Conversations Being Received (CBS television45
broadcast Feb. 27, 2000) [hereinafter 60 Minutes], available at http://www.freerepublic.com/
focus/f-news/1543347/posts.
Douglas C. McNabb & Matthew R. McNabb, Of Bugs, the President, and the NSA: Na-46
tional Security Agency Intercepts Within the United States, THE CHAMPION, Mar. 2006, at 10, 15.
See id.47
NSA or restricted its permissible scope of activities.   Instead, the agency was born38
from executive directives—directives vague in their delegation of authority and in
their definition of the type of information permissible for the agency to collect.39
Under this secrecy, the NSA operated and operates the nation’s largest intelligence
agency, subsuming a large share of the estimated $40 billion budgeted annually to the
intelligence community.   The NSA’s role in the intelligence community is as the40
primary collector of signals intelligence (SIGINT).   SIGINT is a catchall term that41
includes all intelligence derived from communications, as well as from electronic and
instrumentation emissions.   The NSA collects this information through highly techno-42
logical sensors, including listening posts, satellites, and satellite dishes.   For instance,43
the NSA maintains over twenty satellite dishes alone in Menwith Hill, England.   The44
NSA integrates these sensors into a global spy system often referred to as ECHELON,
which is maintained with the cooperation and contribution of England, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand.  Former Congressman Bob Barr described ECHELON45
as the equivalent of a global vacuum cleaner that sucks up signal intelligence from all
over the world and then provides this information to intelligence analysts to exploit.46
The result of this global surveillance network is a massive amount of raw intel-
ligence, including virtually every electronic conversation around the world.   This47
information is generally sifted through by data mining techniques that register particular
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See Walter Pincus, NSA Gave Other U.S. Agencies Information from Surveillance,48
WASH . POST, Jan. 1, 2006, at A8.
See Nat’l Sec. Agency, Signals Intelligence, http://www.nsa.gov/sigint/index.cfm49
(last visited Aug. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Signals Intelligence].
Signals Intelligence, supra note 49; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.50
See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.51
See id.52
Id.53
Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1889.54
See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 312–13 (1972) (“There is,55
understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that this capability [electronic sur-
veillance] will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding citizens. We look to the
Bill of Rights to safeguard this privacy.”); Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 10–13, 30
(statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.) (describing the mission creep associated with the
NSA collection program, Operation MINARET).
Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 2.56
See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6. Such undue expansion can also occur from an57
effort to be more discriminatory in the use of surveillance. For example, in Operation
MINARET, discussed infra at notes 79–86 and accompanying text, the NSA sought to
amplify its target selection by including a target’s address or potential aliases. Though this
process sought great precision in the identification of a target, the result was the collection
words, phrases, or voices.   The NSA collects this information for analysis by tactical48
and strategic military leaders, policymakers, and other intelligence agencies.49
For much of its history, the immense capabilities and collection framework of the
NSA were limited to targeting foreign powers and organizations.  The Bush admini-50
stration changed that scope by allowing the NSA to conduct warrantless electronic
surveillance on persons in the United States.   No longer would the NSA restrict its51
warrantless actions to foreign to foreign terminal communications, but it would now
include information originating from or going to a domestic terminal.   The New York52
Times, in the article that broke this issue to the public, estimates that the NSA eaves-
drops on an estimated 500 persons in the United States at any given time.   President53
Bush, so as to alleviate the fears stressed in reference to the intercepted calls, stated,
“They are from outside the country to in the country or vice versa.  So in other
words, . . . if you’re calling from Houston to L.A., that call is not monitored.”   The54
inclusion of any domestic terminal, however, is the crux of the concern expressed
by the public, the legal profession, and Congress.
During the 1970s, similar concerns about the capabilities and the expanding power
of the NSA were expressed by both Congress and the Supreme Court.   Senator Church55
noted the constitutional and civil liberties concerns during the 1975 congressional
hearings regarding abuse of power by the NSA stating that “[t]he danger lies in the
ability of the NSA to turn its awesome technology against domestic communications.”56
The warrantless NSA surveillance authorized by President Bush has already shown
signs of the gradual expansion that generally follows the employment of such collection
programs.   The program initially sought to exploit the telephone numbers and e-mail57
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and use of more information. See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 13 (statement of
Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.).
Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6 (detailing the original intent to exploit the information58
contained in computers, cellphones, and personal phone directories of Al Qaida operatives,
including Abu Zubaydah, captured by the CIA in Afghanistan and Pakistan).
See id. (describing how the chain of connections quickly expanded).59
See Keith, 407 U.S. at 324 (holding the use of electronic surveillance for domestic60
security without prior judicial approval unlawful); Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 2
(detailing the need for congressional hearings to address the abuse of power by the NSA).
407 U.S. 297. See generally Church Hearings, supra note 7.61
See Keith, 407 U.S. at 316–18 (“These Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be62
guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion
of the Executive Branch.”).
Id. at 299.63
Id. at 300.64
Id. at 299.65
Id. at 301.66
addresses from Al Qaida operatives captured in Afghanistan.   It naturally expanded58
to include individuals linked more and more tenuously with the originally identified
targets.   While mere speculation, it will be interesting to see whether this program59
expanded even further to include members of protest groups in the United States or
to target individuals in support of the military operation in Iraq.
The concerns associated with the NSA surveillance are not limited to institutional
apprehension, but they are closely linked to a history of abuse of this technology during
the Cold War period.   The activities and abuses by the NSA rose to public conscious-60
ness during the 1970s, specifically as a result of the Watergate scandal and the resulting
congressional hearings.  The particular nature of the abuses are most appropriately
understood through judicial efforts to address those activities in the Supreme Court
case of United States v. United States District Court (Keith) and through congressio-
nal efforts evidenced by the Church Committee Hearings in 1975.61
The Supreme Court, in 1972, sought to curb executive branch discretion to employ
national security wiretaps to further domestic security.   In the Keith case, the Supreme62
Court faced the question of whether the President could authorize electronic surveil-
lance without prior judicial approval in domestic security matters.   The wiretaps at63
issue were justified with the purpose “to gather intelligence information deemed
necessary to protect the nation from attempts of domestic organizations to attack and
subvert the existing structure of the Government.”   The government sought to use64
information gathered by this surveillance in the prosecution of three defendants charged
with the bombing of a CIA office in Michigan.65
The government argued that the President’s national security power made the
surveillance lawful, despite its warrantless nature.   The Supreme Court began its66
analysis by noting that Article II of the United States Constitution provides the
President with the power and duty to protect against those who would plot against the
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Id. at 310.67
Id. at 314 (“The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an68
unchecked surveillance power.”).
See id. at 316–17.69
See id. at 320.70
See id. at 320–21.71
See id. at 322–23; Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets (Title III) Act of 1968,72
Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520
(2000 & Supp. III 2003)) (providing protective standards applicable to electronic surveillance
for general crime control).
See generally Church Hearings, supra note 7.73
See BAMFORD , supra note 36, at 289–90.74
See id.75
See generally Church Hearings, supra note 7.76
Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 1 (statement of Sen. Frank Church).77
See, e.g., id. at 30, 57–58 (detailing secret surveillance programs Operation MINARET78
and Operation SHAMROCK).
government.   The national security justification, however, is wrought with constitu-67
tional problems, especially when “the Government attempts to act under so vague
a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security’” due to the difficulty of defining
the imperative interest.   The Court raised the concern that the discretion to conduct68
the electronic surveillance rested solely within the executive branch, disabling the
officers in charge from constituting the neutral and disinterested judiciary contemplated
by the Fourth Amendment.   In addition, the Court rejected the government’s argu-69
ments that practical circumstances foreclosed the ability to obtain a warrant and that
internal security matters are too complex and subtle for the courts to evaluate.70
Thus, the Supreme Court held that warrantless domestic electronic surveillance,
even when justified by national security imperatives, must comply with traditional
Fourth Amendment standards.   The Court went on to invite Congress to consider71
protective standards for domestic security contexts in a manner similar to the stan-
dards that were specifically detailed in congressional regulation of electronic sur-
veillance for ordinary crime.   Congress responded to this invitation, in part, by de-72
bating the appropriate protective standards during the Church Committee Hearings.73
Congress conducted extensive hearings into presidential abuse of power during
the Watergate scandal.   At the Watergate Hearings, Congress and the public were74
first exposed to the vast and unregulated nature of the nation’s intelligence agencies
but particularly to the National Security Agency.   Congress acted upon these reve-75
lations and public outcry by holding public and executive session hearings to under-
stand and expose the nature of the NSA’s activities.   This Congressional inquiry76
would be later called the Church Committee Hearings and would serve the self-labeled
purpose of bringing “the Agency from behind closed doors.”77
Senator Church and the other members of the select committee conducted much
of the hearings in closed, executive session, but the public hearings present a substan-
tive view of the illicit surveillance conducted by the NSA.   Information on two78
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See id.79
See id. at 10–11, 30 (statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.). Indications exist that80
this surveillance began even earlier in the 1960s to monitor United States citizens traveling to
Cuba. See id. at 10. This concern likely dovetailed with concerns at the time that the assas-
sination of President Kennedy resulted from Cuban retaliation for attempts against the life
of Fidel Castro. See S. COM M . ON ASSASSINATIONS, H.R. REP. NO . 95–1828, pt. 2, at 109–14
(1979). The 1969 charter for MINARET was to provide for “more restrictive control and
security of sensitive information derived from communications” and “specifically include[d]
communications concerning individuals or organizations involved in civil disturbances, anti-
war movements/demonstrations and military deserters involved in anti-war movements.” Id. at
150 (Exhibit 3: July 1, 1969 Memo from an Assistant Director, NSA).
Church Hearings, supra note 7,  at 11 (statement of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr.).81
Id. at 10.82
See id. The problematic nature of Operation MINARET became even more apparent83
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Keith described supra in notes 61–72. See BAMFORD ,
supra note 36, at 292.
Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 12.84
See id. at 10.85
See id. at 37–38.86
Id. at 57–58.87
previously classified programs, Operation MINARET and Operation SHAMROCK,
was approved for public dissemination, and those programs provide an illuminating
view of what FISA sought to prevent from occurring in the future.79
Operation MINARET officially began in 1969.  It formalized the process that
began in 1967 to utilize the NSA to intercept communications in order to determine
the existence of foreign influence on civil disturbances occurring in the United
States related to the Vietnam War and to assist in presidential protection.   During80
the period between its inception and its subsequent discovery and termination in
1973, the emphasis of the NSA surveillance soon expanded to include international
drug trafficking and acts of terrorism.81
In practice, MINARET constituted a “watch list” of activity whereby the NSA
sorted through the electronic communication captured by identifying particular words,
names, subjects, and locations.   The problematic nature of MINARET entailed the82
placement of American citizens and organizations on the watch list.   During83
MINARET’s operational years, the watch lists contained roughly 1,650 names of
United States citizens, with up to 800 names on the list at any given time.   The84
operation internally justified the activity not only based upon the national security
need for the information, but also because it expanded the term “foreign intelligence”
to require only one foreign terminal from which the communications originated.85
It was, however, this ability to define foreign intelligence to include domestic terminals
and persons that led to congressional criticism.86
The second clandestine program that the Church Committee unearthed and exposed
to the public was codenamed Operation SHAMROCK.  SHAMROCK entailed a87
message-collection program whereby the NSA tasked private international telegraph
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Id. The private companies were RCA Global, ITT World Communications, and Western88
Union International. Id. (statement of Sen. Frank Church); see BAMFORD , supra note 36, at
240–41 (describing the details of the message-collection program instituted with RCA).
Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 59.89
Id. at 58.90
Id. During the 1970s, NSA subjected roughly 150,000 messages per month to further91
review by intelligence analysts. Id. at 60. Cf. BAMFORD , supra note 36, at 241 (detailing the
concerns about illegality of such a program expressed by both Western Union and RCA).
See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 10, 60.92
See id. at 62 (statement of Sen. Gary Hart, Member, S. Select Comm. to Study Govern-93
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities).
See id. at 12–13, 57–58 (statements of Lieutenant Gen. Lew Allen, Jr., and Sen. Frank94
Church).
See id. at 61. Senator Goldwater, while arguing against disclosure of this information95
to the public, conceded that “[t]he American people expect the Congress to take remedial
action when necessary.” Id.
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (2002).96
See Title III, Pub. L. No. 90–351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.97
§§ 2510–2520 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)); see also Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Bazan &
companies to provide certain international communications to the intelligence agency.88
This program originally began operating in 1947 under the control of the Army
Security Agency, which relinquished operational control over SHAMROCK first to
the Armed Forces Security Agency upon its creation in 1949 and then again to the
NSA in 1952.89
At the outset of the program, the efforts focused on extracting only “international
telegrams relat[ed] to certain foreign targets.”   This purpose changed throughout90
the years to include the extraction of telegrams for certain United States citizens.91
As with Operation MINARET, no constitutional infirmity resulted from Operation
SHAMROCK while its efforts targeted foreign terminal to foreign terminal communi-
cations.   Operation SHAMROCK became illegal, both as a violation of the Fourth92
Amendment of the United States Constitution and, as argued at the Church Committee,
in violation of the Communications Act of 1934, once it began to target United States
citizens and domestic terminals.   A noteworthy and instructive element of both93
Operation MINARET and Operation SHAMROCK is that each program gradually
and shamelessly expanded beyond its original scope and initial justification.94
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TITLE III AND THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT
As a result of the Church Hearings, Congress felt compelled to take remedial action
in terms of a comprehensive statutory framework.   The result was the passage of95
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in 1978.   FISA began, however,96
not as a separate act but as an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (Title III).   Title III authorized and regulated the use97
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Jennifer K. Elsea, Legislative Attorneys, Am. Law Div., Cong. Res. Serv., 14–17 (Jan. 5. 2006)
[hereinafter Bazan & Elsea], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m010506.pdf (pro-
viding a general framework and analysis for the constitutional and statutory arguments that the
President has employed to justify the NSA electronic surveillance).
United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 301–02 (1972); Bazan & Elsea,98
supra note 97, at 14.
See Keith, 407 U.S. at 302.99
389 U.S. 347 (1967).100
388 U.S. 41 (1967) (holding that the use of electronic devices to hear conversations101
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment); see Keith, 407 U.S. at 102; Bazan & Elsea,
supra note 97, at 8. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (holding that the Fourth Amendment
applies to recording oral statements).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 352–53.102
See Keith, 407 U.S. at 308.103
See id. at 302–03. The insertion of this proviso was orchestrated, at least in part, by104
Roy Banner, a top lawyer at the NSA. BAMFORD , supra note 36, at 256. Banner helped draft
this loophole to provide the legal cover for the NSA’s domestic signal intelligence. Id.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.105
Id. at 322–23 (“Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment106
if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of government for intelligence
information and the protected rights of our citizens.”).
See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 17–18. See generally FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§107
of electronic surveillance for criminal law enforcement purposes.  It required that
such surveillance be authorized by prior judicial approval and circumscribed the
conditions for its use.   Congress intended the passage of Title III to ensure the privacy98
interests of domestic persons, while providing the government with the flexibility
to ensure effective crime control.   The process and procedures provided by Title III99
for the Attorney General to seek a court order authorizing electronic surveillance
were drafted to satisfy constitutional requirements provided by the Supreme Court
in Katz v. United States  and Berger v. New York.   It should be pointed out that100 101
Katz included oral communications within the purview of the Fourth Amendment
even if no physical trespass was required to obtain these conversations.102
The procedures provided by Title III sought to regulate electronic surveillance
for criminal law enforcement, but they did not attempt to address electronic surveillance
conducted pursuant to national security interests.   Title III included a proviso in the103
original section 2511(3) that expressed congressional neutrality on the issue of regulat-
ing the President’s national security powers to conduct electronic surveillance.104
Based on that proviso and the general purpose of Title III, the Supreme Court, in
Keith, stated that the act did “not attempt to define or delineate the powers of the
President to meet domestic threats to the national security.”105
The Supreme Court in Keith also recognized that different protective schemes
may be required when distinguishing between efforts to conduct general criminal
surveillance and those that involve domestic security.   Congress would accept this106
invitation to provide a separate but integrated protective scheme for electronic sur-
veillance driven by national security interests with the passage of FISA.   In passing107
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1801–1811 (2002).
Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 17–18.108
Id. at 14.109
S. REP. NO . 95–604, pt. 1, at 15 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3916.110
See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18 (detailing the relaxed probable cause standard111
in FISA compared with the more traditional probable cause requirement in Title III).
See Title III, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516, 2518 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).112
See id. § 2511. Section 2511(1) applies a civil penalty to any person who “intentionally113
intercepts,” “intentionally uses,” or “intentionally discloses” electronic communications except
for narrow exceptions such as when the person has been authorized by a separate federal
statute (e.g., FISA). Id. § 2511(1)(a)–(e).
See infra notes 147–72 and accompanying text.114
See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3907 (describing the intent of115
Congress for FISA and Title III to constitute the exclusive means by which domestic electronic
surveillance may be conducted); David Cole et al., On NSA Spying: A Letter to Congress,
N.Y. REVIEW  OF BOOKS, Feb. 9, 2006, at 42; Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 14.
FISA, Congress carved a separate legal regime from Title III to address and govern
the collection of “foreign intelligence” through electronic surveillance methods.108
Title III remains to govern ordinary criminal law enforcement purposes.   Congress109
in enacting FISA sought to “provide the secure framework by which the executive
branch may conduct legitimate electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes
within the context of this Nation’s commitment to privacy and individual rights.”110
The different protective schemes for the use of electronic surveillance provided
in Title III and FISA demonstrate the different balancing of the governmental interest
against the resulting privacy intrusion on an individual.   Specifically, under Title III,111
the Attorney General or an authorized representative must apply for a court order
approving the electronic surveillance through a process similar to a search warrant.112
The statute strictly prohibits nearly all electronic surveillance conducted outside of
the court authorization detailed in section 2516.   FISA does not provide for any113
wide-ranging exceptions for non-authorized surveillance, but three statutorily cir-
cumscribed exceptions exist and are described below.114
The comparison and relationship between the protective schemes provided in
Title III and those provided in FISA are illuminating because they show: (1) broad,
if not exclusive, congressional regulation in the sphere of electronic surveillance; (2)
specific congressional intent for FISA to govern foreign intelligence surveillance as
distinct from general criminal law enforcement; and (3) the provision of a more
relaxed protective standard and application process to allow the executive branch
to address the national security need for foreign intelligence collection through a
congressionally authorized statutory scheme.115
A. Statutory Framework of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)
The protective scheme designed by Congress for the collection of foreign intel-
ligence sought to recognize and address the government’s legitimate need to collect
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See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 7–8, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3908–09 (“[This bill] goes a116
long way in striking a fair and just balance between protection of national security and pro-
tection of personal liberties.”).
See ELIZABETH B. BAZAN , THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT: AN117
OVERVIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAM EWO RK AND RECENT JUDICIAL DECISIONS 8–16
(CONG. RES. SERV. 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL30465.pdf.
See id. at 2 n.6.118
Id. The USA PATRIOT Act increased the FISC to eleven district court judges, at least119
three of whom must live within a twenty-mile radius of the District of Columbia. Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–56, § 208, 115 Stat. 272, 283
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
BAZAN , supra note 117, at 2 n.6.120
See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 5, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3907.121
See id. at 5–6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3906–07 (recognizing that exigent circumstances122
may require a limited departure from the congressionally preferred judicial application and
approval process).
See id.123
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1805(f), 1811.124
such intelligence, while also providing a method for judicial intervention to protect
against invasions into the privacy interests of individuals unearthed during the Church
Committee Hearings.116
In order to effectuate this delicate balancing between the important government
interest and the protection of individual privacy, Congress designed and implemented
a special court that would provide both the expediency and secrecy needed to address
foreign intelligence concerns, while retaining the important protection of placing a
neutral judicial representative between the government enforcement officials—the
intelligence community as represented by the Attorney General—and the people or
places targeted for surveillance.   The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance117
Court (FISC) and the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(Court of Review) were constituted to serve this purpose.   The composition of the118
FISC originally included “seven U.S. district court judges publicly designated by the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.”   Three U.S. district court or119
U.S. court of appeals judges, again publicly designated by the Chief Justice, constituted
and still constitute the Court of Review.120
Congress designed this special court system to review executive branch applica-
tions for electronic surveillance aimed at obtaining foreign intelligence.   This appli-121
cation process sought to mirror the traditional law enforcement warrant process to
the extent that national security exigency and practicality would allow.   This122
congressionally preferred application process also envisions situations when, similar
to the traditional warrant process, the exigency of the situation demands a deviation
from the more formal procedure.   To accommodate these special circumstances,123
FISA includes three exceptions that provide additional latitude for the executive
branch.   The first exception allows for surveillance without a court order when the124
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See id. § 1802; S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 50, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3951–52.125
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1805(f), 1811; S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 51–52, 1978126
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953; H.R. REP. NO. 95–1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063. For a further discussion of these exceptions, see infra notes 147–72
and accompanying text.
S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 5, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3906 (detailing the intent to provide127
two layers of appeal for the government after a denial of a FISA warrant by the FISC).
See, e.g., Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18, 23–26 (detailing FISA’s relaxed probable128
cause standard and the major exceptions designed to provide limited executive branch electronic
surveillance based on exigent circumstances).
This requirement is largely formalistic, but its purpose is consistent with Congress’s129
desire to provide an internal check by requiring written accountability within the executive
branch for the decision to engage in electronic surveillance. See S. REP. NO. 95–604, at 48–49,
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
The Attorney General’s certification must be in writing to serve the internal check130
function, and it must attest to the satisfaction of the statutory requirements for the application
detailed in § 1804 and that, under his or her belief, probable cause exists. FISA, 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(a)(2); S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 43–44, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3945. The statutory
requirements for the application are set forth in § 1804. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a). The require-
ment that the Attorney General, Acting Attorney General, or Deputy Attorney General personally
approve the application was intended to provide a bulwark against high-ranking official
pressure from the heads of agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency or the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 36, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3937–38.
The requirement for probable cause is discussed further infra at notes 139–46 and131
accompanying text.
The flexibility given to the executive branch in the FISA requirements is intended to be132
offset by the requirement for reasonable minimization procedures. These procedures are designed
to restrict the information obtained concerning United States persons through electronic surveil-
lance to foreign intelligence pursuant to a general policy of limiting the acquisition, retention, and
targets are solely foreign governmental entities because of the lesser privacy interests
at stake.   The second and third exceptions allow for surveillance with only retro-125
spective FISC review because the national security imperative renders immediate
surveillance necessary and the traditional court order process impracticable.126
Finally, if the FISC denies the application for electronic surveillance, FISA provides
two layers of judicial review, with appeal first to the Court of Review and second to the
United States Supreme Court.127
The FISC order process differs from the traditional warrant process as it provides
greater deference to the executive branch through relaxed application standards.128
After an application is made, a FISC judge must issue a warrant if:  (1) the President
has authorized the Attorney General to approve applications for such electronic sur-
veillance;  (2) the application has been approved by the Attorney General;  (3)129 130
on the basis of facts submitted to the court, probable cause exists to believe the target
of the surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and that the place
at which the surveillance is directed is being used or about to be used by that foreign
power or agent;  (4) the minimization procedures (minimization) seek to limit acquisi-131
tion, retention, and dissemination;  and (5) if the target is a United States person,132
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dissemination of information. See S. REP. NO. 95–604, at 54–55, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3956;
S. REP. NO. 95–701, at 41 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4010. Congress
recognized that the best practice to accomplish this goal is to encourage the destruction of
information that provides no foreign intelligence information. S. REP. NO. 95–701, at 42, 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4011. The definition of “minimization procedures” requires a course of action
“reasonably designed” in relation to the specific purpose of the electronic surveillance requested.
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1). The specific procedures required, therefore, are fact-specific and
may depend upon the scope of the enterprise under investigation, the location and operation of
the target, the government’s expectations of the character of the parties and calls, and the length
of the surveillance. S. REP. NO. 95–604, at 37–38, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3939. The Attorney
General must provide a statement of the proposed minimization procedures and the FISC judge
will review the statements for their reasonableness. FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(5), 1805(a)(4).
The “clearly erroneous” standard is discussed further infra notes 137–38 and accompany-133
ing text. For the necessary findings required before issuance of a FISA warrant, see FISA,
50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 48–49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.134
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (“Upon an application made pursuant to section 1804 of135
this title, the judge shall enter an ex parte order . . . .”) (emphasis added); see S. REP. NO .
95–604, at 48–49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 48, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950. Though this may appear136
to present a rubber stamp procedure, the purpose is to assure written accountability within
the executive branch for the decision to engage in electronic surveillance, thus providing an
internal check against arbitrariness. Id. at 48–49, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.
Id. at 48, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950.137
Id. The “clearly erroneous” standard was intended to be less strict than a finding of138
probable cause. Id.
See Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18.139
Id.; see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (defining probable cause for140
general law enforcement as “where ‘the facts and circumstances within [the arresting officers’]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or
the certification is not clearly erroneous.   Congress intended through this framework133
to provide a scheme of internal checks within the executive branch and external checks
with the interjection of review by a neutral judge to curb arbitrary executive action.134
The deference provided to the executive branch in this process is evident from the
limited, ministerial judicial review by the FISC judge and the relaxed probable cause
standard.  First, when the executive branch satisfies the application requirements, the
FISC judge must issue the FISA warrant.   The FISC judge is not permitted to substi-135
tute his or her judgment for that of the executive branch and has no authority to “look
behind” the application.   The one exception to this lack of discretion occurs when136
the surveillance targets a United States person.   “In such a case, the judge must137
review the certifications to determine whether they are clearly erroneous.”138
The second area of deference to the executive involves the requirement of probable
cause.   The probable cause requirement in Title III closely tracks the traditional139
probable cause requirement and necessitates a showing that the “target has committed,
is committing, or is about to commit a crime.”   FISA, however, requires only that the140
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is being committed.” (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925))).
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2002); see Bazan & Elsea, supra note 97, at 18. The six141
groups or entities that constitute a “foreign power” and the groups or individuals that represent
an “agent of a foreign power” are defined in § 1801. FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)–(b).
See S. REP. NO . 95–701, at 11–13 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973,142
3980–81.
See id.143
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).144
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A).145
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3).146
FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1) (electronic surveillance of communications exclusively147
between or among foreign powers for up to one year), 1805(f) (emergency orders for up to
seventy-two hours), 1811 (wartime exigency for up to fifteen days following a congressional
declaration of war).
See S. REP. NO. 95–604, pt. 1, 1, 3–5, 50–51 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.148
3904, 3904, 3905–06, 3952.
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1) (surveillance on foreign powers for up to one year),149
1805(f) (emergency orders for up to seventy-two hours), 1811 (fifteen days after declaration
of war).
target of the electronic surveillance be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power
and that each of the places targeted is or will be used by a foreign power or agent of a
foreign power.   As a result, the standard for probable cause in the FISA context is141
not as strict as for general crime control.   FISA does not require a finding that a crime142
is imminent or that the elements of a specific crime exist, but it requires instead a
more speculative standard that allows surveillance to occur at an earlier stage in the
investigative process.   This speculative standard is evidenced in the agency-based143
definition for an “agent of a foreign power.”   A person may satisfy this statutory144
definition, and thus satisfy the probable cause requirement, when a person “knowingly
engages” or “may involve” oneself in subversive activities.   In addition, the FISC145
judge must make this determination based upon the facts and circumstances provided
by the executive branch.   The probable cause requirement, therefore, defers greatly146
to the executive branch to allow it to determine when probable cause exists and then to
provide the FISC judge only limited discretion to challenge such a determination.
B. Exceptions to the Congressionally Preferred Court Order Process
In addition to the deference and flexibility that Congress gave to the executive
branch for obtaining a judicial order authorizing electronic surveillance, Congress also
contemplated three scenarios when the exigencies of national security needs could
require limited surveillance without a FISC order.   Each of these scenarios defers in147
favor of the national security imperatives when balancing the need for adequate intelli-
gence against the preservation of privacy rights.   Congress sought, however, to limit148
these exceptions to court-ordered electronic surveillance by restricting the target and
duration, as well as imposing additional procedural safeguards.149
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FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A).150
Id. § 1802(a)(1).151
Id.152
Id. § 1802(a)(3).153
Congress did intend, however, for limited judicial review of the effectiveness of the mini-154
mization procedures in order to protect United States persons from undue surveillance. See
S. REP. NO . 95–604, pt. 1, at 51 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904, 3952.
Congress, when discussing the exception of the same official foreign powers from provid-155
ing a factual description under the preferred court ordered process, stated that “the sensitivity of
the surveillance is greatly multiplied while the risk of a fruitless surveillance which will not ob-
tain any foreign intelligence information is greatly reduced.” Id. at 45, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3946.
Id. at 48–50, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3950–51.156
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a).157
See id. § 1801(a)–(c); S. REP. NO . 95–701, at 17 (1978), as reprinted in 1978158
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3986.
See S. REP. NO . 95–701, at 17, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3986.159
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (partially incorporating the definition of foreign160
power in § 1801(a)); § 1801(a)(1)–(3); cf. § 1801(a)(4)–(6).
The most expansive exception to court-ordered surveillance occurs when the elec-
tronic surveillance targets official foreign powers (Foreign Powers Exception).   Con-150
gress provided the executive branch with the ability to conduct electronic surveillance
to acquire foreign intelligence for up to one year without a court order as long as the
Attorney General certifies in writing to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the following con-
ditions exist:  (1) the target falls within an official foreign power definition, (2) there is
no substantial likelihood a United States person will be a party to the communication,
and (3) reasonable minimization procedures are in place.   The Attorney General’s cer-151
tification must occur at least thirty days prior to the effective date of the surveillance,
unless the surveillance must occur immediately, which then requires the Attorney Gen-
eral to notify the committees immediately.   In addition, the Attorney General must, in152
all situations, “immediately transmit” a copy of the certification under seal to the FISC.153
In order for the Attorney General to authorize the surveillance, there is no require-
ment of judicial review or approval,  no need to provide a factual detail of the infor-154
mation sought by the electronic surveillance,  and no court control over the duration155
of the surveillance unless it exceeds one year.   Instead, arbitrary electronic surveil-156
lance is limited by the internal checks required to obtain the Attorney General’s appro-
val, the external checks of written justification to the FISC and the congressional
committees, and the substantive check of statutory requirements.157
The definition of foreign powers in this exception provides the most substantive
check on its scope.   The Foreign Powers Exception only applies to entities that158
are clearly “arms of a government.”   This definition excludes the more privately-159
controlled entities such as terrorist groups and foreign-based political organizations,
as well as the entire category of agents of a foreign power.160
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S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 50, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3951–52.161
Id.162
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).163
S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 52, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953.164
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).165
Id. This application must be made even if the surveillance is terminated before the twenty-166
four hour emergency period expires. See S. REP. NO. 95–604, at 52, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953.
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).167
Id. (“In the event that such application for approval is denied, or in any other case where168
the electronic surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving the surveillance, no
information obtained or evidence derived from such surveillance shall be received in evidence
or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand
jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United
States person acquired from such surveillance shall subsequently be used or disclosed in any
other manner by Federal officers or employees without the consent of such person, except with
the approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of death or serious
bodily harm to any person.”).
See S. REP. NO . 95–604, at 51–52, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3953.169
This substantive restriction not only limits the exception but justifies it.  The inclu-
sion of this exception amended the original Senate bill and provoked widespread
criticism among the Senate Judiciary Committee.   The Ford administration argued161
for the exception and justified it on three grounds:  (1) the determination that an entity
fits one of the three special classes of foreign powers “is not likely to be erroneous,”
(2) “the likelihood of obtaining valuable foreign intelligence” from these targets is
high, and (3) such surveillance is likely required for longer periods of time.162
Congress also contemplated that the need for electronic surveillance could occur
during an emergency when obtaining a court order would be impossible before the
surveillance should begin.   In such a situation, Congress intended to place the163
Attorney General in the role of the FISC during the emergency period until judicial
review could be obtained.164
The limits on this exception include the expiration of authorization for such
electronic surveillance after seventy-two hours or when the information sought is
obtained.   In addition, the following requirements must also be satisfied:  (1) the165
factual basis exists under the general FISA requirements to support the surveillance;
(2) a FISA judge must be immediately notified of the emergency surveillance, (3)
an application pursuant to the preferred method of authorization must be processed
as soon as practicable,  and (4) minimization procedures must still be followed.166 167
This exception also incorporates an exclusionary provision that prevents information
gathered through this exception to be used in a judicial proceeding unless the FISC
issued a court order approving the surveillance.   The limits placed on this excep-168
tion balance the need to provide the executive branch with the flexibility to respond
to immediate, emergency national security needs within a framework that retains the
external checks of judicial review.169
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of the passage of the AUMF); Tom Daschle, Editorial, Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST,
Dec. 23, 2005, at A21.
See GRIM M ETT, supra note 178, at 1–2; Daschle, supra note 178.179
The final exception allows the Attorney General to authorize electronic surveil-
lance without a court order in a time of war.   This authorization expires after fifteen170
days and requires a preceding declaration of war by Congress.   Congress intended171
this exception to provide a limited time period in which the President could conduct
electronic surveillance without a court order while Congress considered whether any
amendments to FISA were required to address the new wartime scenario.172
III. THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE AUTHORIZATION FOR
USE OF M ILITARY FORCE
The Bush administration makes three principle and mutually independent argu-
ments in an effort to defend the legality of the warrantless electronic surveillance
program.   Specifically, the administration argues that:  (1) the surveillance program173
satisfies the statutory requirements of FISA;  (2) the President retains inherent and174
exclusive authority to conduct such an electronic surveillance program;  and (3)175
even if the President does not have exclusive authority, Congress affirmatively en-
dorsed the President’s actions.176
In advancing the first and third arguments, the administration relies upon a broad
interpretation of the 2001 joint resolution of Congress referred to as the Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force (AUMF).   Congress passed the AUMF in the wake177
of the September 11 terrorist attacks and in anticipation of an armed invasion of
Afghanistan.   Congress and the President worked in concert over two hectic days178
to draft and pass the joint resolution.   The resulting resolution passed on September179
14, 2001 includes a long preamble detailing the terrorist attacks and the need for a
national response followed by a general paragraph that states:
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That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.180
The administration argues that the broad language of the AUMF, including the
phrase “all necessary and appropriate force,” implicitly authorized the President to
conduct the warrantless surveillance of domestic targets.   In addition, the adminis-181
tration relies upon the 2004 United States Supreme Court case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,182
that interpreted the AUMF broadly enough to authorize the detention of an American
citizen captured on the battlefield of Afghanistan.183
The administration errs, however, when interpreting the AUMF to include elec-
tronic surveillance of domestic targets because:  (1) the legislative history demon-
strates the limited authority granted to the President and (2) the Hamdi holding does
not extend the “battlefield” to which the AUMF applies to the United States.
A. The Legislative History of the AUMF Demonstrates a Limited Grant of Authority
The legislative history of the AUMF is sparse due to its quick enactment resulting
from a decision to forego the formal committee legislative review process.   A com-184
parison of the White House and congressional drafts of the joint resolution and the
public statements made during the drafting process provides some information on
the extent of authority granted.   The original draft resolution provided by the White185
House contained broad language that would authorize the President to use force
against the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, as well as “to deter and pre-empt
any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States.”   This last pro-186
vision authorized force without any requisite nexus between the threat of attack and
the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks.   Richard Grimmett, in his Congressional187
Research Service Report for Congress on this issue, states that this portion of the draft
resolution sparked strong opposition in Congress, when a concern about the extent
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Id. at 510–11, 516–17. The applicable section of the Non-Detention Act reads: “No196
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an
Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517.197
of the authorization led to a key amendment to the resolution.   The joint resolution188
that resulted limited the grant of authorization to the use of force against those in-
volved in the attacks on September 11.   The modification Congress made to the189
White House draft makes clear that the extent of the authorization does not apply to
terrorists generally but only to those people or parties directly connected to the
attacks.190
Former Senator Daschle, who helped negotiate the joint resolution, also recounted
after the revelation of NSA surveillance in December 2005 that the administration
sought to add the term “in the United States” after “appropriate force” in the text of
the resolution.   Senator Daschle explained that this addition “would have given the191
president broad authority to exercise expansive powers not just overseas—where we
all understood he wanted authority to act—but right here in the United States, poten-
tially against American citizens.”   The administration, by seeking this amendment,192
clearly demonstrated its understanding that its power was limited to overseas.   Thus,193
based on this legislative history, the AUMF did not authorize the use of electronic sur-
veillance for domestic terminals but restricted the extent of the authority given to the
President to prosecute armed conflict overseas.194
B. The Hamdi Holding Does Not Extend the “Battlefield” to Which the AUMF
Applies to the United States
The Attorney General also makes the argument for a broad reading of the AUMF
based upon the United States Supreme Court plurality opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.195
In Hamdi, the Court addressed the issue of whether the AUMF constituted an “Act
of Congress” that would render the Non-Detention Act inapplicable to the capture of
an American citizen.   The administration argued for a broad interpretation of the196
AUMF that would allow the government to bypass the Non-Detention Act and detain
American citizens indefinitely based on the authority granted by the AUMF.   The197
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See id.205
See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 12.206
Supreme Court agreed with the government’s conclusion, but it did so by applying
a much narrower interpretation of the AUMF.198
Instead of reading the AUMF as a broad authorization of force against terrorism
generally, the Court provided a narrow holding that the AUMF authorizes that
[t]he United States may detain, for the duration of these hostili-
ties, individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combat-
ants who “engaged in an armed conflict against the United
States.”  If the record establishes that United States troops are
still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions
are part of the exercise of “necessary and appropriate force,” and
therefore are authorized by the AUMF.199
When the military detained an American citizen who fell within this category, he
or she could be detained for the duration of the active hostilities because detention
constituted an important incident of war.   The Court went on to find active hostilities200
to be ongoing by referencing a conventional indication of armed conflict—troop
strength—to demonstrate that Afghanistan remained a battlefield and then proceeded
to distinguish the Civil War era Supreme Court case of Ex parte Milligan.   Milligan201
stands for the proposition that American citizens may not be tried by military tribunals
when they are not captured on the battlefield of war.   In Milligan, the incident to202
war—military tribunals—could only be properly employed in a battlefield where
Article III courts were inoperable.   The Court in Hamdi applied the equivalent of203
the Milligan battlefield concept and narrowly held detention—the incident of war
at issue—proper when an American citizen is captured on the battlefield.204
The Hamdi holding, therefore, does not aid the administration in justifying the
NSA surveillance pursuant to the AUMF.   In fact, the administration misstates205
the holding when it says that Hamdi “authorize[s] the detention of an American
within the United States.”   The Court in Hamdi clearly stated that the narrow issue206
addressed was whether an American citizen found on the battlefield in Afghanistan
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could be detained in contravention of the Non-Detention Act.   The Court’s holding207
does not reach whether an American citizen could have been detained within the
United States pursuant to the AUMF, which would provide the pure analogy.208
To apply Hamdi, one must recognize the incident of war at issue to be electronic
surveillance instead of detention but the battlefield would, as in Hamdi, be limited
to the field of traditional, armed conflict (Afghanistan).   The battlefield would not209
extend to include domestic terminals within the United States, much as the battlefield
of the Civil War did not extend into the state of Indiana.   If it did, then the natural210
expansion would be, as Robert Levy at the Cato Institute points out, that the AUMF
would apply to pure domestic to domestic terminal surveillance as well.   If Indiana211
did not constitute a battlefield during the Civil War, New Jersey certainly does not
constitute a battlefield when the armed forces are engaged in Afghanistan.212
This interpretation of the AUMF is consistent with the recent five-three decision
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which the Supreme Court addressed the President’s power
to establish military tribunals for suspected terrorists being held in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.   In interpreting the AUMF, the Court found nothing in the text of legislative213
history hinting that Congress wanted to alter the provisions of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.   Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, characterized it this way:214
“Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”215
C. Congress Speaks After the AUMF:  Subsequent Amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act
The Bush administration also proceeds with its arguments for the legality of the
warrantless electronic surveillance under the supposition that the AUMF represents
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See id.; Sept. 20, 2001 Address, supra note 223, at 1350.226
the most recent congressional action on the issue of electronic surveillance.216
Congress has, however, spoken multiple times since September 18, 2001, the date of
the enactment of the AUMF, on this issue through statutory amendments to FISA.217
The most substantial amendments to FISA came from the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act).   In addition to the PATRIOT Act, Congress also has218
made substantial amendments through the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002,  the Homeland Security Act of 2002,  the Intelligence Reform and219 220
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,  and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and221
Reauthorization Act of 2005.222
The amendments to FISA were not passed solely on congressional initiative but
were passed, ironically, in response to needs identified by the Bush administration.223
President Bush, in an address to the nation and to a Joint Session of Congress on
September 20, 2001, stated, “We will come together to give law enforcement the
additional tools it needs to track down terror here at home.  We will come together
to strengthen our intelligence capabilities, to know the plans of terrorists before they
act and find them before they strike.”   He also recognized the continued vitality224
of a court order process when he said,
When we’re talking about chasing down terrorists, we’re talking
about getting a court order before we do so.  It’s important for our
fellow citizens to understand, when you think PATRIOT Act,
constitutional guarantees are in place when it comes to doing
what is necessary to protect our homeland, because we value the
Constitution.225
This and similar statements made by the President identified the need for changes
to the existing FISA structure, but they also implied the continued vitality of FISA
requirements and the intent to act within those statutory requirements.226
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Congress responded to the call for changes to FISA by providing the President and
the executive branch additional flexibility to conduct electronic surveillance under
FISA.   The PATRIOT Act made significant modifications to the scope of surveil-227
lance allowed under FISA and increased the bureaucratic ability of the FISC to handle
more FISA applications.   Specifically, the PATRIOT Act provided additional district228
court judges, roving and multipoint electronic surveillance authority, more flexibility
for pen registers and trap and trace devices, and additional access to business records.229
The PATRIOT Act also made a significant modification that lessened the require-
ment for valid electronic surveillance from one with the primary purpose of obtaining
foreign intelligence to one with a significant purpose.   Congress intended that the230
change promote the sharing of information between the intelligence community and
the law enforcement community.   In addition, Congress recognized the overlap be-231
tween traditional law enforcement purposes and intelligence purposes, and it sought
to ensure that FISA did not restrict the use of the statutory framework in cases when
this overlap existed.   The Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case, affirmed this inter-232
pretation of the addition of the word “significant” and held that it allowed the gov-
ernment to use the FISC order to conduct electronic surveillance as long as some
broader objective existed than solely criminal prosecution.233
The PATRIOT Act also expanded the authority to address two concerns uniquely
associated with the terrorist threat:  (1) roving or multipoint surveillance  and (2)234
the “lone wolf” amendment.   Through the allowance for roving or multipoint sur-235
veillance, Congress sought to modernize FISA to allow the government to continue
to intercept a terrorist’s communications despite the target changing cell phones
frequently or moving from safehouse to safehouse without having to return for a
new court order for each new phone or landline used.   The “lone wolf” amendment236
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broadened the FISA definition of an “agent of a foreign power” to include individuals
for whom no affiliation with a foreign power or entity could be established.   Once237
again, the intent of the amendment sought to encourage the use of the FISA
statutory framework for terrorist suspects.238
Finally, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 made one addi-
tional and extremely relevant modification to the emergency exception to the general
FISC order process.   The amendment authorizes the Attorney General to conduct239
electronic surveillance in an emergency situation for seventy-two hours.   FISA previ-240
ously provided only twenty-four hours.   The result is a practical concession that the241
executive branch may need the flexibility to conduct such surveillance to address the
modern terrorist threat.242
Congress’s amendments to FISA demonstrate the intent that the FISA framework
for electronic surveillance survived despite the joint resolution authorizing the President
to commit the armed forces following the September 11 attacks.  Even if we were to
accept the argument that Congress had spoken through its legislation and the AUMF
did control electronic surveillance in contravention to the FISA framework, this
authority would have been limited to the time required for Congress to react and speak
again on this issue.   This interpretation would be consistent with the congressional243
intent associated with the declaration of war exception to the general court order
process, which was intended to provide the President a short period of executive
discretion, followed by congressional adaptation to the situation by statute.244
IV. FAILURE TO FOLLOW FISA  AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL RAMIFICATIONS
A. The Failure to Satisfy the FISA Framework
Attorney General Alberto Gonzalez, in his Department of Justice White Paper
supporting the legality of the NSA surveillance, argues that the electronic surveillance
conducted conforms and is “fully consistent with the requirements of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act . . .”   The Attorney General does not define “fully con-245
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sistent,” however, to mean full compliance.   Instead, the Bush administration’s argu-246
ment is that FISA envisions scenarios where the statutory requirements would be
inapplicable to the President.   Specifically, the administration relies upon section247
1809, which details the criminal sanctions levied upon one who conducts prohibited
surveillance, and its provision that “[a] person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally
. . . engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as authorized by
statute.” (the Exception Clause).   This argument then relies upon the Authoriza-248
tion for Use of Military Force (AUMF)—the Congressional Joint Resolution passed
in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks—as the authorizing statute.249
It is important to note that this far-fetched argument surfaced as the President
scrambled to justify the warrantless NSA surveillance.   In fact, during a press con-250
ference on December 19, 2005, three days after the public learned about the warrantless
surveillance, the President justified the surveillance by distinguishing FISA as a
framework for long-term monitoring, as opposed to the need for warrantless surveil-
lance to “detect” terrorists.   The President’s statements show an awareness, or at251
least a belief, that the nature of the NSA surveillance operated outside of the man-
dates of FISA but did not rest on a belief that the operations satisfied the FISA
requirements, even to the technical extent argued by Attorney General Gonzalez.252
Even assuming that the President understood and justified the surveillance based
upon this technical and myopic view of the FISA provision, the argument lacks
merit due to the statutory interpretation of the “authorized by statute” provision,
especially in light of its legislative purpose.   In addition, the AUMF provides a use253
of force resolution that the FISA framework specifically contemplated, making this
argument disingenuous and calling into question the President’s constitutional require-
ment that he “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”254
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FISA specifically expresses and defines the exceptions to its preferred court
order process.   The Bush administration’s reliance on the “except as authorized by255
statute” provision in the criminal sanctions section of FISA unduly reads an additional
exception into this framework.   The administration reads this provision broadly to say256
that it stands for an expansive proposition that any congressional statute that purports
to allow for electronic surveillance could authorize presidential action outside the
FISA requirements.   The administration supports this position and interpretation by257
comparing the language of the FISA criminal sanctions provision to the Title III
criminal sanctions provision.   The Attorney General argues that the Title III pro-258
vision, which states, “[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter,”
shows the ability of Congress to reference internally, and therefore, the different lan-
guage in FISA shows the intent that it apply more generally and not be limited only
to subsequent amendments to FISA or to provisions provided for in Title III.   This259
argument proceeds upon a misunderstanding of both the Title III provision, as well
as the language and intent of the provision in FISA.
The legislative history does not conclusively resolve the issue of whether a narrow
interpretation of the FISA provision limiting the term “statute” to only FISA and
Title III provisions or a broad interpretation that views “statute” as referring to any
congressional statute is correct.   The House Conference Committee did consider260
a Senate and House version of what would become section 1809.   The Senate bill261
sought to conform the FISA criminal sanctions provision to Title III and provide that
culpability would follow a knowing violation of FISA, “except as provided in this
bill.”   Due to its addition as a conforming amendment to Title III, the Exception262
Clause would apply only to FISA and Title III provisions.   The House version pro-263
vided for separate criminal penalties from Title III and included the more ambiguous
language later adopted.   In adopting the House version, the Conference Committee264
stressed that the choice turned on the desire to include “[a] defense . . . for a defendant
who was a law enforcement or investigative officer engaged in the course of his official
duties and the electronic surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to
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See Title III, 18 U.S.C § 2511(2)(f); H.R. REP. NO . 95–1720, at 35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.273
at 4064.
a search warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”   The language265
of this defense closely follows what would be later held by the Supreme Court, in
United States v. Leon, to constitute a “good faith” exception to the exclusionary rule.266
The decisions by the Conference Committee to allow for the equivalent of a
“good faith” defense does not counsel either a broad or narrow interpretation of the
Exception Clause.   It does, however, suggest that Congress did not voice disagree-267
ment with the Senate bill’s Exception Clause that provided a clear and narrow appli-
cation to only FISA and Title III provisions, but it focused primarily on including
the House’s “good faith” defense.268
The preference for a narrow interpretation is bolstered, if not confirmed, by the
exclusivity provision found in section 2511(2)(f) of Title III.   The exclusivity pro-269
vision states, “[P]rocedures in this chapter or chapter 121 . . . and the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic
surveillance, as defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic
wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.”   The House Confer-270
ence Committee for FISA debated between this language as contained in the Senate
bill and a House amendment that would have added the word “statutory” after “exclu-
sive” to modify and restrict the exclusivity.   The Conference Committee rejected271
the House amendment in an attempt to exercise complete congressional power in
this area and to apply the standard set forth in Justice Jackson’s concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.   Based on this specific legislative history,272
it is undeniable that Congress, through its language and its intent, sought the provisions
of Title III and FISA to provide express and complete congressional authorization
in the area of electronic surveillance.273
The expressly exclusive nature of Title III and FISA resolves any ambiguity as to
the proper interpretation of the Exception Clause in favor of a narrow interpretation
that reads “statute” as internally referencing the provisions of FISA and Title III.
This interpretation also coincides with the well-settled canon of statutory interpretation
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See id. For a description of the statutory framework of the Authorization During Time280
of War exception, see supra notes 170–72 and accompanying text.
FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811. The House amendments to the Senate bill originally called281
for a one-year time period. H.R. REP. NO . 95–1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063.
H.R. REP. NO . 95–1720, at 34, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4063.282
See id.; FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1811.283
known as lex specialis derogat legi generali, which provides that narrow and specific
statutory provisions should supplant general provisions.274
B. The AUMF Does Not Supersede the FISA Framework
The administration’s theory that the Exception Clause provides legal authority
under FISA also fails because the AUMF does not constitute an authorizing statute.275
The administration argues that the broad language in the joint resolution that authorizes
the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organi-
zations, or persons” that aided in the terrorist attacks of September 11 confers upon the
President the power to conduct domestic electronic surveillance.   As discussed above,276
the administration incorrectly interprets the AUMF as granting broader authority
than either Congress intended or the Supreme Court has recognized.   There is no277
doubt that Congress provided the President the authority to employ the armed forces
of the United States against the Taliban in Afghanistan in the effort to catch the mem-
bers of Al Qaida who were responsible for planning and executing the terrorist attacks.
It is a very different contention, however, that this broad and general language
specifically authorized the President to circumvent FISA’s statutory requirements.278
The strongest argument against the administration’s position is found in the statu-
tory language of FISA itself.   FISA provides an express exception for authorization279
during a time of war.   The President may authorize electronic surveillance without280
a court order for fifteen days following a declaration of war.   The House Conference281
Committee explicitly addressed this provision and settled on fifteen days to “allow time
for consideration of any amendment to this act that may be appropriate during a war-
time emergency.”   The statutory language and legislative history provide a clear282
indication that Congress considered the legal framework applicable during wartime and
provided a vehicle for a subsequent Congress to provide the President the authority
needed to address the immediacy of the situation while Congress reconsidered the statu-
tory guidelines.   When this specific language conflicts with a general statutory provi-283
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The power of appointment and removal of executive officers is an example of an exclu-291
sive power vested solely in the President. The Congress has no power to legislate in this area.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926).
sion such as the AUMF, the same canon of statutory interpretation described above—
lex specialis derogat legi generali—counsels application of the specific provision.284
In addition, the subsequent amendments to FISA described above demonstrate
that the AUMF is not controlling law on the matter of domestic electronic surveil-
lance.   The administration assumes throughout its white paper that Congress has285
not superseded the AUMF but focuses on the ability of the AUMF to provide
authority outside of the FISA context.   Even if the AUMF did initially exempt the286
President from the statutory requirements of FISA, the subsequent amendments to
FISA present more recent congressional legislation on the issue of electronic surveil-
lance and should control in any analysis under the Exception Clause.  There is no con-
tention, even by the Bush administration, that the warrantless electronic surveillance
program satisfies the explicit requirements of FISA, even as amended.287
C. The President Has No Inherent Constitutional Power to Authorize     
Warrantless Surveillance
The Bush administration argues that even if the warrantless surveillance program
fails to satisfy the requirements of FISA, such surveillance is permissible as an exercise
of inherent constitutional power.   This argument rests on a belief that the President288
holds the exclusive power to conduct the electronic surveillance at issue, thus making
Congress’s efforts to regulate in this area unconstitutional.   This assertion, however,289
is unsound because the President must rely upon concurrent war powers to conduct
electronic surveillance, and this would require the President to obtain either congres-
sional authority for the acts or to demonstrate that Congress had not acted within
this sphere of authority.290
The Constitution distributes power either exclusively or concurrently among the
three branches of government.   The Framers of the Constitution debated extensively291
over whether to follow the British model and vest war powers solely in the executive
branch or to jettison popular wisdom and distribute them between the executive and
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and Offences against the Law of Nations;
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concerning Captures on Land and Water;
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To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.10–16.
FISHER, supra note 290, at 8.294
See id. at 8–9.295
JAM ES MADISON , NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at296
475–77 (Ohio Univ. Press 1966).
Id. at 476. Roger Sherman was the only person to have signed all four major founding297
documents: the Continental Association of 1774, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles
of Confederation, and the United States Constitution. USHistory.org, Signers of the Declaration
of Independence: Roger Sherman, http://www.ushistory.org/declaration/signers/sherman.htm
(last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
See MADISON, supra note 296, at 476. Central to the delineation of war powers was the298
idea that the making of peace, which required Presidential action and Senate approval, should
be more flexible than the facilitation of war. Id. The decision to vest greater power in Congress
to make and prosecute a war was, in fact, a conscious decision and an effort to hinder the ability
legislative branches.   The Framers decided on the latter and vested war powers in292
Congress through seven clauses in the Constitution, while also providing the President
the significant power to direct and control war as the Commander-in-Chief.   Due293
to these constitutional grants, the nation’s war powers must be understood to be held
concurrently between the executive and Congress.  The question that remains is to
what extent.
Louis Fisher, in his book Presidential War Power, argues that the debates during
the Constitutional Convention demonstrate the clear intent by the Framers to hinder
the President’s ability to employ the military unilaterally.   The power to “declare294
war” granted to Congress provided the legislative body with the ultimate authority to
commit the United States armed services to war, while reserving to the President the
authority to repel a sudden attack.   The notes of the Constitutional Convention main-295
tained by James Madison support this opinion.   Roger Sherman, during the debate296
over whether to define the congressional power as “to make war” or “to declare war”
stated, “The Executive sh[ould] be able to repel and not to commence war.”   Eldridge297
Gerry and James Madison agreed and chose the word “declare” in an effort to partition
war powers along this line—providing the President the ability to repel sudden
attacks but vesting Congress with the ultimate authority to bind the nation in war.298
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natsec/RL31133.pdf (providing a historical background on declarations of war and authori-
zations for the use of military force).
Id. The eleven separate formal declarations of war were in the context of five wars and300
were against: (1) Great Britain (1812), (2) Mexico (1846), (3) Spain (1898), (4) Germany
(1917), (5) Austria-Hungary (1917), (6) Japan (1941), (7) Germany (1941), (8) Italy (1941),
(9) Bulgaria (1942), (10) Hungary (1942), and (11) Rumania (1942). Id. at 4–6. For a list and
brief description of major examples of congressional authorization of military force, see id.
at 6–20.
See JOHN YOO , THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN301
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 12 (2005).
Id.302
See id.; FISHER, supra note 290, at 144–45.303
See FISHER, supra note 290, at 144–45.304
DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6.305
See id. at 6–7.306
See id. at 6–7 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319307
(1936)).
The concurrent nature of war powers is evidenced by their employment throughout
American history.   Congress has passed eleven separate formal declarations of war299
and numerous authorizations for the use of force, and in most cases Congress granted
the authority after a President’s request.   Presidents in the post-World War II era,300
however, have argued and acted against this concurrent power.   Military actions in301
Grenada, Panama, Somalia, and Kosovo, in addition to President Truman’s use of force
in Korea, all began and were conducted without congressional authorization.302
Congress fought the erosion of its concurrent power by passing the War Powers
Resolution (WPR) in 1973 in an attempt to statutorily limit the President’s use of
force.   In fact, the WPR seeks to reassert Congress’s concurrent war powers, despite303
actually ceding some constitutional powers to the President.   The fact that multiple304
presidents have taken dubious constitutional positions on the use of force does not
justify or validate such actions or change the limits of constitutional language and
intent.  In fact, when viewing the list of military actions taken without congressional
approval, the wisdom of the Framers appears reinforced.
The Bush administration rejects that concurrent power exists to conduct warrant-
less foreign intelligence surveillance.   The administration does not contend,305
however, that this inherent authority derives solely from the President’s war powers
as Commander-in-Chief.   Instead, the administration relies on the theory that the306
President is the “sole organ” of foreign affairs.   The “sole organ” theory is implied307
from the President’s role as the prime communicator between the United States and
other nations, and supporters often cite to John Marshall’s statement on March 7,
1800, in the House of Representatives, that “[t]he President is the sole organ of the
182 W ILLIAM &  MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 15:147
10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800), available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/308
lwaclink.html#anchor6.
FISHER, supra note 290, at 21.309
299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936); DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6–7.310
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See Wartime Executive Power Hearings, supra note 211, at 10 (statement by Robert312
A. Levy).
S. REP. NO. 95–701, at 34–35 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4003–04.313
See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 138–39 (statements between Sen. Frank Church314
and Philip B. Heymann, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
See Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319–20.315
See id.316
See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 6–7; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6.317
nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”308
This authority over foreign affairs may intersect with war powers because supporters
of the sole organ theory argue that the President, acting under this authority, “may
initiate military operations to fulfill the foreign policy.”   The Bush administration309
espouses this idea by citing to the Supreme Court case of United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., which held what Marshall argued—that the President has
plenary power in the field of international relations.   The administration then applies310
this foreign affairs power and presumes its foundation for the assertion that the
President’s power “to protect the Nation from foreign attack” includes the ability to
conduct electronic surveillance to achieve that aim.311
The administration’s argument that the President’s foreign affairs power provides
inherent authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance fails for two reasons:
(1) the administration improperly defines the collection of foreign intelligence to
include domestic terminal surveillance and (2) the presidential power to protect the
nation from attack does not originate in the power over foreign affairs.
First, the argument that the President has the inherent power to conduct war-
rantless electronic surveillance to collect purely “foreign intelligence”—foreign termi-
nal to foreign terminal communication—is correct and undisputed.   The legislative312
history of FISA does not recognize explicitly that the collection of wholly overseas
communication is an inherent presidential power, but it also does not seek to reach
and regulate that area of collection.   The Church Committee Hearings also sought to313
differentiate among foreign terminal to foreign terminal communications and those
that include either the targeting of a U.S. person or a domestic terminal.   The policy314
behind placing this authority in the hands of the President is that the effects of
overreaching would damage diplomatic relations and not the civil liberties of a U.S.
person.   Diplomatic issues are better left to the President under his foreign affairs315
power and responsibilities.316
The Bush administration unduly expands the term foreign intelligence to include
foreign terminal to domestic terminal communications.   The inclusion of domestic317
places and persons in the surveillance authorized exceeds the scope of the President’s
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The Curtiss-Wright case also involves congressional endorsement on the issue faced by322
the Court. Though this case was decided before the framework of presidential power provided
by Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown, the issuance by Congress of a joint resolution
supporting the exercise of presidential power would have placed the President’s action at the
apex of power. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 311–12.
DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 7.323
See FISHER, supra note 290, at 8–9.324
See id.325
Id.326
MADISON , supra note 296, at 475 (statement by Charles Pinkney).327
foreign affairs power.   The reliance on the widely criticized Curtiss-Wright case318
to support this proposition also proves the deficiency of the argument.   In Curtiss-319
Wright, the Court provided an expansive holding on presidential power in the realm
of international relations by addressing the ability to impose arms embargoes in South
America.   The Court explained its holding, however, by distinguishing between320
domestic and foreign power, limiting its holding to expansive authority for foreign
power.   The holding of Curtiss-Wright, therefore, does not extend to support presi-321
dential actions against domestic persons and places.   To act within the domestic322
sphere on this issue, the President would need to exercise his war powers—powers
shared concurrently with Congress—and not rely solely on his broader foreign
affairs power.
Second, the Bush administration reaches the erroneous conclusion that the foreign
relations power justifies warrantless domestic surveillance by appealing to the President’s
authority and duty to prevent and repel a sudden attack.   It is widely accepted that a323
President is empowered with this authority.   What prompts disagreement is the Bush324
administration’s claim that this power comes from the more expansive foreign affairs
powers and not the decidedly concurrent war powers shared with Congress.   The325
history of the Constitutional Convention demonstrates that the Framers thought this
power to be part of the general delegation of war powers held concurrently between
Congress and the President.   It was conceded by opponents that the President must326
have power in an emergency to act independently of Congress, especially given the
concerns expressed during the Convention debates that a Congress meeting only once
per year could not react quickly enough to counter immediate threats.327
This power contemplated unilateral presidential action, but that power would fall
within a limited scope of emergency authorization and then could be limited by con-
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limiting this authority to the time required for Congress to meet, deliberate, and legislate in
response to the emergency. See H.R. REP. NO . 95–1720, at 34 (1978) (Conf. Rep.), as
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4048, 4063.
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Id. at 582–83 (majority opinion).330
Id. at 641–42 (Jackson, J., concurring).331
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gressional action once the legislative body had the time to assemble and speak under
its war powers on the issue.   President Bush’s reliance on the power to repel a sudden328
attack, therefore, relies upon war powers shared concurrently with Congress.
D. The President’s Authority for Electronic Surveillance Falls into the Third
Youngstown Category
The modern approach to the constitutional validity of a presidential action derives
from Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.329
Youngstown challenged President Truman’s seizure of steel mills amidst a nationwide
strike of steelworkers.   President Truman invoked his powers as Commander-in-330
Chief to justify the seizure because of the indispensable nature of steel production
to the war effort in Korea.   Justice Jackson recognized that presidential power is331
not always fixed, but that it may fluctuate in strength due to the relationship between
the President and Congress on the contested issue.332
The Court held President Truman’s seizure order unconstitutional.   In doing so,333
Justice Jackson, in a concurrence, provided the framework now relied upon to adjudge
presidential power.   Jackson sought not to delimit a President’s power to act in an334
emergency but to provide three analytical categories that allow for a fluctuation of
power dependent upon congressional support.   The categories Jackson provided are:335
(1) the presidential power is at its apex when the President acts pursuant to an express
or implied authorization of Congress, (2) the presidential power is within a “zone of
twilight” when the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, and finally (3) the presidential power is at the “lowest ebb” of power when
measures are taken that are incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.336
Although the Youngstown categories are logical and largely outcome determina-
tive once a presidential action is assigned, the difficult part is determining whether
the action contravenes congressional action.   In Youngstown, Justice Jackson con-337
cluded that the steel seizure order conflicted with congressional legislation upon the
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See S. REP. NO. 95–604, pt. 1, at 5–6 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,345
3907. The legislation so completely occupied the field of electronic surveillance that it actually
prompted Senator James Abourezk to oppose the measure because of its exclusive nature. In his
minority views, Senator Abourezk argued that the President should have some power in this area,
but that the legislation foreclosed the ability of the President to exercise any power in this area
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Id. at 6, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3907.346
“occasions, grounds and methods for seizure of industrial properties.”   Jackson338
found that Congress occupied the field of industry seizures through the Selective
Service Act of 1948, the Defense Production Act of 1950, and the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947.   After finding the field occupied, Jackson concluded that the339
third category of constitutional power applied to invalidate the seizure order.   Once340
the third category applied, the presidential action could only survive constitutional
scrutiny if the President held the power exercised exclusive of Congress.341
The application of the Youngstown principles to the warrantless NSA surveil-
lance depends primarily on the characterization of the congressional action on this
issue.  The Bush administration argues that the congressional joint resolution in
2001 for the AUMF endorsed the presidential action and placed the power exercised
in the first Youngstown category.   The counter-argument is that FISA occupies the342
field of such electronic surveillance and its provisions were not supplanted by the
passage of the AUMF.343
The AUMF contains broad statements of purpose and general provisions capable
of many interpretations regarding the scope of power authorized.   If no congressional344
voice had sounded in the area of electronic surveillance, the argument for implied
authorization by Congress through the AUMF may have been stronger.  This is,
however, not the case.
Congress provided clear statements during the passage of FISA to demonstrate
intent to provide the exclusive and exhaustive procedure for the use of electronic sur-
veillance to collect foreign intelligence.   In the summary of the FISA legislation345
passed by the House of Representatives, this intent was clearly expressed by the state-
ment:  “The bill . . . combined with chapter 119 of title 18 [Title III] . . . constitutes
the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as defined, and the interception
of domestic wire and oral communications may be conducted; the bill recognizes no
inherent power of the President in this area.”346
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See id.; AUMF, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2000 & Supp. 2002).354
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504 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1992) (citing Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482356
U.S. 437, 445 (1987)); see also Cole et al., supra note 115, at 42.
Prior to the passage of FISA, the only statutory restrictions on electronic surveil-
lance existed for purely domestic criminal action through Title III.   Title III included347
a disclaimer clause found in the original section 2511(3) that did not disturb presidential
power in this area.   When Congress enacted FISA, it amended that provision in348
Title III to remove any deference to presidential prerogative in the area of electronic
surveillance.349
In addition to the clear congressional intent to occupy the field of electronic
surveillance, Congress also anticipated a Youngstown inquiry into this issue.   The350
House Conference Committee stated that “[t]he intent of the conferees is to apply
the standard set forth in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in the Steel Seizure
Case,” and to place presidential power in the area of electronic surveillance at its
“lowest ebb.”351
No justification exists for the position that the general authorization language of the
AUMF supersedes the specific and exclusive language of FISA.   FISA specifically352
contemplates the applicability of its statutory framework despite the declaration of
war.   In order for the AUMF to authorize the warrantless NSA surveillance, authority353
by implication from a general statute would have to govern over the specific regulation
found in FISA.   Such a result would be inconsistent with both case law and generally354
accepted rules of statutory construction.
When two statutory provisions conflict, the canon of statutory interpretation
lex specialis derogat legi generali provides that narrow and specific statutory
provisions should supplant general provisions.   The Court recognized this principle355
of statutory interpretation that the specific governs the general in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., in which the Supreme Court rejected the assertion that a general
statutory clause governing available remedies governs over a specific substantive
preemption provision.   The Supreme Court also settled a question of conflicting356
statutes by holding that a specific statute governs the general in International Paper
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Co. v. Ouellette.   The Court resolved the question of whether a general provision357
in the Clean Water Act that preserved an injured party’s ability to seek relief super-
seded the statute’s comprehensive regulation and specific provision of remedies.358
The Court held the specific provisions govern and stated, “we do not believe
Congress intended to undermine this carefully drawn statute through a general
savings clause . . . .”359
Under this principle of statutory interpretation, FISA would govern electronic sur-
veillance unless an authorization of military force provided some unique justification
to part with the well-settled principle.   This argument, however, was rejected in360
Youngstown in a similar context.   The Supreme Court in Youngstown rejected the361
Truman administration’s argument that the President’s war powers could trump specific
congressional statutes that governed the seizure of industrial property.   Though362
Congress never passed an authorization of force in the context of the Korean War,
Truman purported to act within the scope of the United Nations Participation Act and
in accordance with implied congressional authorization.   The Court rejected the363
argument that a war context could empower the President to dismiss specific congres-
sional regulation on the utilization of a war power.364
The Bush administration argues that the AUMF requires a broad reading to super-
sede FISA.   As discussed above, the administration unduly interprets the AUMF to365
grant more authority than Congress intended to provide or that the Supreme Court has
recognized.   In addition, an interpretation of the AUMF that authorized domestic366
surveillance would render the fifteen day exception for a declaration of war provided
for in FISA section 1811 meaningless.   Upon declaration of war, the fifteen day367
exception provides a standby statutory authority designed to authorize automatically
limited presidential action outside of the scope of the FISA framework.   Congress368
has legislated standby statutory powers both in the formal declaration of war context
and in the expanded use of national emergency declarations as a vehicle to allow
flexibility in presidential reaction, while retaining congressional statutory control.369
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ACKERM AN &  GRIM M ETT, supra note 299, at 26–27. One of the key modern374
differences between formal declarations of war and authorizations of force is the fact that the
latter does not trigger automatically standby statutory authorizations. See id. at 27.
See BAZAN , supra note 117, at exsum.375
See supra notes 216–44 and accompanying text.376
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson,377
J., concurring).
See id.378
The scope of modern standby powers is largely the result of a Senate special com-
mittee initially charted in June 1972 to address congressional displeasure with the
President’s use of war powers in the context of Vietnam.   This Senate committee was370
co-chaired by Senator Frank Church—the same Senator who chaired the Senate
hearings that led to the passage of FISA.   The committee found that no process371
existed to terminate automatically national emergency proclamations and sought to
modify standby powers to include a limitation in scope and duration.   The passage372
of FISA occurred after the conclusion of these hearings in May 1976 and the hearings’
conclusions likely influenced the inclusion of a limited standby authorization in
section 1811 in case of a declaration of war.373
An authorization of force provides less, or at least no greater, power to the
President than a declaration of war.   Thus, because Congress demonstrated in FISA374
the desire to provide standby authorization, it would do damage both to the integrity
of the statutory language itself and the obvious contemplation of its application in a
time of war to construe a general authorization of force as superseding its provision
and leaving it without meaning.
Finally, any ambiguity that remains as to whether Congress intended the AUMF
to supersede FISA dissolves when considered in the context of subsequent amendments
to FISA.   As discussed above, Congress took great strides since September 11 to375
modify and amend FISA to apply to the current threats of terrorism, while retaining its
basic purpose of judicial review.   The conclusion that must be drawn from the376
amendments to FISA is that Congress intended the framework to stay in force despite
authorizing the President pursuant to the AUMF.  As a result, Congress’s intent that
FISA remain the statutory framework for electronic surveillance to collect foreign intel-
ligence places the President’s action in contravention to FISA’s statutory framework
and into the third category of the Youngstown framework.   The President’s power377
would be at its lowest ebb and permissible only if the President retained the power
exercised exclusive of the legislature.   Because war powers are shared and concurrent378
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See id.379
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).380
Id.381
Id. at 2799.382
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.383
Id.384
Id.385
“Though the Fourth Amendment speaks broadly of ‘unreasonable searches and386
seizures,’ the definition of ‘reasonableness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific
commands of the warrant clause.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 315
(1972) (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950)).
See generally United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (focusing on the387
reasonableness of the “totality of circumstances” approach); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985) (finding that school officials do not need probable cause to search students so
long as the search was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the search).
between the President and Congress, the President’s action fails the Youngstown
test and is, therefore, unconstitutional.379
This conclusion is consistent with Justice Kennedy in his concurrence in Hamdan
in which he specifically referred to the Youngstown test.   He pointed out that the380
President had no power to create a military tribunal as he acted in a field with a history
of congressional involvement.   This legislative involvement sets a limit on presidential381
power. Kennedy stated,
Where a statute provides the conditions for the exercise of govern-
mental power, its requirements are the result of a deliberative and re-
flective process engaging both of the political branches.  Respect for
laws derived from the customary operation of the Executive and Legis-
lative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of crisis.382
V. THE NSA  SURVEILLANCE VIOLATES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment consists of two clauses joined by the conjunction “and.”383
The first clause is a prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the
second clause deals with the requirements for a warrant.   These warrant requirements384
include the justification required for the issuance of a warrant (probable cause) and
the limitations on the scope of the warrant (particularity).   For much of the Fourth385
Amendment’s history, the warrant clause was read in conjunction with the reasonable-
ness clause so as to give meaning to the vague term “unreasonable.”   Thus, in order386
for a search to be reasonable, it generally required probable cause and a warrant speci-
fically describing its scope.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has abandoned this approach and has focused
exclusively on the reasonableness clause without necessarily considering its relationship
to the second warrant clause.   For example, in 2001, the Court in United States v.387
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T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340 (omissions in original) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United389
States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring)).
See 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967).390
Id.391
See id. at 535.392
See id. at 538–39.393
See id. at 538 (“Having concluded that the area inspection is a ‘reasonable’ search of394
private property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it is obvious that ‘probable cause’
to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling.”).
See, e.g., id. at 535.395
See, e.g., Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602–03 (1981) (upholding warrantless396
inspections required by the Mine Safety and Health Act); see also United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972) (upholding warrantless inspections required by the Gun Control Act of 1968).
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).397
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).398
See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).399
Knights stated that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”388
The decision in Knights built upon earlier holdings that recognized that “[t]he funda-
mental command of the Fourth Amendment is that searches and seizures be reasonable,
and although ‘both the concept of probable cause and the requirement of a warrant
bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited circumstances neither
is required.’”389
An early example of this approach can be found in the administrative search
context.  The Court encountered governmental searches in which traditional probable
cause concepts requiring individual suspicion of wrongdoing did not work, such as
housing code inspectors searching large areas for violations.  In Camara v. Municipal
Court of San Francisco, the Court turned to the reasonableness clause and devised
a balancing approach to this issue.   The Court stated that “there can be no ready test390
for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against
the invasion which the search entails.”   On one side of the balance, the Court391
weighed the governmental interest or need to conduct the particular type of Fourth
Amendment activity.   On the other side of the balance, the Court looked to the392
intrusion that a particular search entailed.   This balance resulted in the validity of393
an administrative search adjudged by the reasonableness of its administrative regula-
tions instead of the existence of probable cause.394
Initially, warrants were required for these administrative searches unless some
exigency was present.   Over time, however, the Court began dispensing with the395
warrant requirement for heavily regulated businesses and when warrants would inhibit
the inspections, with a limitation being the requirement that the regulations provide
an adequate substitute for the particularity requirements of a warrant.396
The Court has expanded the administrative search rationale to include border
searches,  drunk driving checkpoints,  and, by implication, airport searches.   One397 398 399
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531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000).400
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).401
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663–65 (1995) (upholding suspicionless402
and warrantless drug testing because it provides an administrative process with a minimal amount
of discretion); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770–71 (1966) (holding a warrantless
blood alcohol content search reasonable due to blood’s rapid loss of its alcohol content); see also
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“The ‘special needs’ doctrine . . . is
an exception to the general rule that a search must be based on individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing.”); Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 661 (“It is a mistake, however, to think that the
phrase ‘compelling state interest,’ in the Fourth Amendment context, describes a fixed, minimum
quantum of governmental concern, so that one can dispose of a case by answering in isolation
the question: Is there a compelling state interest here?”).
469 U.S. at 340.403
See id. at 341–42.404
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721–25 (1987) (plurality opinion) (work-related405
searches of employees’ desks and offices).
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 876 (1987).406
See DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24, at 37–39.407
important limitation to keep in mind is that these searches are upheld because their
purpose is something other than the general crime control objectives.  For example, in
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court refused to allow police checkpoints
to interdict narcotic traffic because the principal purpose of the checkpoint was to
detect evidence of criminal wrongdoing.400
Also evolving from the administrative search rationale is a subcategory often
referred to as “special needs” situations.  Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion
in a high school search case, referred to this subcategory as applying when “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and [/or]
probable-cause requirement[s] impracticable.”   Reasonableness is ensured in these401
situations by limiting the discretion of the governmental officials involved and
requiring a situation in which obtaining a warrant would simply not be practical.402
For example, the Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. stated, “The warrant requirement,
in particular, is unsuited to the school environment:  requiring a teacher to obtain a
warrant . . . would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal
disciplinary procedures needed in the schools.”   These “special needs” categories403
have allowed for warrantless and suspicionless Fourth Amendment activity in
situations such as public school searches,  public employee searches,  and searches404 405
of people on probation.406
It is through the utilization of general reasonableness balancing and the “special
needs” administrative approach that the Bush administration seeks to justify its warrant-
less NSA surveillance program.   The administration argues that the surveillance407
satisfies the Fourth Amendment and its requirement for reasonableness because the
balance of the governmental interest in protecting against a terrorist attack outweighs
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See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000); Vernonia Sch. Dist.409
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652–54 (1995).
See Vernonia Sch. Dist., 515 U.S. at 654, 658.410
See id. at 663–64.411
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47–48.412
Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1885.413
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.414
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (refusing to sanction random car stops for415
safety violations because the intrusion was great and the method utilized was not particularly
effective given the intrusion).
The legislative history for the passage of FISA recognizes the difficulty of drawing this416
distinction. When surveillance targets U.S. persons, the Senate recognized that “[i]ntelligence
and criminal law enforcement tend to merge.” S. REP. NO . 95–701, at 11 (1978), as reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 3979. The distinction becomes even harder once it is pointed
out that the United States has addressed terrorist acts through traditional law enforcement
means in the past; this includes the bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi and the
Oklahoma City bombing. See M. Wood, U.S. Struggling to Make Law Enforcement, Military
Models Handle Detainees, Terror Suspects, Forum at U. Va. (Nov. 16, 2005), available at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2005_fall/terrorforum.htm.
the resulting intrusion on privacy interests.   It is doubtful that the administration408
can argue credibly that the narrow “special needs” exception applies in this case.
A. Administrative Searches and the Reasonableness Balancing Approach
In balancing the governmental interest with the intrusion, certain factors should be
considered.  On the governmental interest side, the purpose of the search must not
merely promote general crime control, but the method chosen must be narrowly
tailored to advance that legitimate purpose.   On the intrusion side of the balance,409
one looks first to the nature of the privacy interest at stake and then to how the parti-
cular intrusion affects the privacy interest.   In addition, the degree of intrusion will410
be found to increase when the government officials enjoy a greater amount of discretion.411
The first issue to be resolved is whether the purpose of the NSA surveillance
will serve a function other than normal general crime control purposes.   The gov-412
ernment interest in the NSA surveillance searches, at first blush, appears to be rather
compelling.  The Bush administration characterizes the threat of terrorism as “not
simply a matter of law enforcement,” but a war that must be addressed by military
means.   The mere gravity of the threat alone, however, does not resolve this issue.413 414
The nature of the threat must be considered in relation to the law enforcement prac-
tices used to address the threat.415
When there is an imminent terrorist threat, the use of traditional law enforcement
officials and procedures to address terrorism casts doubt on whether a clear distinction
can be made between terrorism and general crime control.   The purpose of the war-416
rantless NSA surveillance is to detect and prevent the death and destruction that
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See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000).421
See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 680–81 (1989)422
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629–30 (1989).
See 489 U.S. at 680–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).423
Id. at 684; see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 608.424
See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 680–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).425
Id. at 682.426
See id. at 684.427
comes from attacks on American people and infrastructure.   It is difficult, if not417
impossible, to determine how a car bomb detonated by an Al Qaida operative is dis-
tinguishable from a car bomb detonated by a domestic criminal.  In 2002, the United
States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, in In re Sealed Case,
recognized that this distinction is especially difficult when attempting to justify
foreign intelligence collection of a United States person under the FISA definition
of an “agent of a foreign power.”   The court noted that “the definition of an agent418
of a foreign power—if he or she is a U.S. person—is grounded on criminal conduct.”419
The warrantless NSA surveillance includes domestic citizens and places; therefore,
it falls within conduct closely associated with criminal activity.   Upholding a warrant-420
less search to effectuate this purpose would constitute an expansion of the Supreme
Court’s narrow “special needs” cases to include searches that employ law enforcement
officials in a manner similar to crime control.421
The “special needs” exception also requires a narrowly tailored nexus between
the governmental purpose and the means used to effectuate that purpose.   Justice422
Scalia, in his dissent in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, highlights
the nexus requirement by distinguishing the programmatic search at issue from the
special needs search in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association.   In Skinner,423
a case involving employee drug tests immediately following a railroad accident, the
Court upheld the ability to drug test railroad employees due to the demonstrated effects
that drugs and alcohol have had on the safety of railroad operations.   Justice Scalia424
distinguished the nexus that existed in Skinner from the justification provided in Von
Raab that sought to administer drug tests to customs officials who were being consid-
ered for promotion.   In Von Raab, the urine testing sought to protect the integrity of425
the Customs Service by discharging employees who, due to their own drug use, may
be unsympathetic to their duty to interdict narcotics.   Justice Scalia argued that the426
nexus presented was too generalized and speculative and could not support a finding
of reasonableness.427
The requirement of a nexus between the purpose and the means employed basically
speaks to the need for a narrowly tailored program when operating outside the warrant
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coverage); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997) (labeling the category of
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See id.431
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See id. (noting that intelligence officials have eavesdropped on people in the United433
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See Church Hearings, supra note 7, at 37–38 (statement by Sen. Walter Mondale).434
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).435
See id.436
See id.437
See id.; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 6; see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,438
659 n.18 (1979) (explaining that officers at a roadblock could permissibly search for stolen
cars but only if the search could be narrowly tailored to address a highway safety need such
as a high-speed getaway, not the general interest in stolen vehicles).
requirement.   The Bush administration argues that the warrantless electronic surveil-428
lance is narrowly tailored to prevent terrorist attacks because the program is only
targeted at individuals who are reasonably believed to be associated with Al Qaida.429
There are no indications, however, that such a program can discriminate to the
necessary degree.   The sparse information released so far on the details of the430
program appears to speak to the opposite conclusion.   There are indications that431
hundreds and maybe thousands of Americans have been targeted by this warrantless
surveillance.   The flexibility, vagueness, and discretion that a definition of a supporter432
or associate of Al Qaida entails—which could conceivably include charitable contribu-
tions to innocuous religious organizations—demonstrates how expansive and unguided
the application of such a vast collection program could be when motivated to prevent
a general terrorist attack.   In addition, one factor that drove the Church Committee433
to recommend what would become FISA was the inability for NSA to discriminate
among proper and improper targets.434
Even if it is possible for the NSA to discriminate accurately between proper and
improper targets, the core question is whether the electronic surveillance could properly
identify information indicating an imminent terrorist attack.   The Bush administra-435
tion cites dicta in Edmond that implies that a warrantless and suspicionless roadblock
would be permissible if employed to “thwart an imminent terrorist attack.”   This436
dicta demonstrates, however, not that stopping a terrorist attack automatically justifies
a traffic roadblock but that a roadblock may, in a situation when an imminent attack
looms, provide a narrowly tailored means to address that threat.   Similarly, electronic437
surveillance may not always lack the adequate nexus when indications of an imminent
terrorist attack require immediate use of the technology, but the program’s four year
duration suggests its use more as a general intelligence tool rather than a narrowly
tailored means to address ripe threats.438
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See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“With few exceptions, the question439
whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be
answered no.”).
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (“Fourth Amendment rights440
. . . are different in public schools than elsewhere . . . .”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (detailing the heavily regulated nature of the railroad
industry and railroad employees).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).441
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 (explaining that the purpose of a warrant requirement is442
to ensure than an objective determination is made as to whether an intrusion is justified).
See 515 U.S. at 663–64; see also Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622 (holding drug testing of443
railroad employees permissible because “the circumstances justifying toxicological testing
and the permissible limits of such intrusions are defined narrowly and specifically in the
regulations that authorize them”).
But see Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1990) (holding an inventory search impermis-444
sible because in the absence of a policy specifically requiring the opening of closed containers,
the government official’s decision to do so constituted the exercise of too much discretion).
See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622.445
See id.446
In analyzing the intrusion, this situation involves a search of ordinary persons and
of information that often emanates from the home—a place of heightened privacy
expectation.   This situation differs from an intrusion on school children or on439
employees in the heavily regulated railroad industry whose privacy expectation is
lessened.   Further, the Court has long recognized the intrusiveness of wiretap infor-440
mation, which further increases the weight on the intrusion side of the reasonable-
ness test balance.441
A further factor to consider in analyzing the intrusion is the amount of discretion
afforded law enforcement.  The standardized nature of programs that satisfy the
“special needs” exception do not simply distinguish the governmental purpose from
general crime control, but they provide additional safeguards that address the same
concerns about arbitrary intrusion on privacy that normally drive the warrant require-
ment.   For instance, the Supreme Court, in Vernonia School District v. Acton, held442
a drug testing program for all student athletes permissible under the “special needs”
exception to the Fourth Amendment partly because the mandatory nature of the search,
rather than random drug testing, makes the program less susceptible to arbitrary
application.   An analogous principle is evident in the Supreme Court’s willingness443
to uphold warrantless and suspicionless inventory searches when standardized criteria
restrict the exercise of discretion of the government official conducting the search.444
These safeguards are relied upon and held sufficient to protect privacy interests
because they detach the determination of the need for a search from those charged
with administering it.   In this manner, standardized policies serve the equivalent445
function of a neutral magistrate in a traditional warrant process.446
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See Dec. 19, 2005 Press Conference, supra note 3, at 1889.451
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989); Risen &452
Lichtblau, supra note 6.
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 64, 663–64 (1995).453
United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith) remains the only case in which the
Supreme Court addressed the use of wiretaps for national security purposes.   In447
holding that electronic surveillance for domestic security, even in light of national
security imperatives, requires a warrant, the Court went on to say that “[t]hese Fourth
Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances
may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.”   Justice448
Douglas, in his concurrence, went even further and stated that given “the clandestine
nature of electronic eavesdropping,” the government bears a heavy burden to show
why a warrantless search is necessary.   He went on to say that449
[t]he Warrant Clause has stood as a barrier against intrusions by
officialdom into the privacies of life.  But if that barrier were
lowered now to permit suspected subversives’ most intimate
conversations to be pillaged then why could not their abodes or
mail be secretly searched by the same authority?  To defeat so
terrifying a claim of inherent power we need only stand by the
enduring values served by the Fourth Amendment.450
The Bush administration argues that periodic review and individual authorization
of the warrantless NSA electronic surveillance by the President and the Attorney
General provides the safeguards necessary to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.   This451
presents a system of authorization in which the discretion as to whether and to what
extent to conduct a search is fused with those in charge of administering the program.452
The electronic surveillance program, therefore, does not contain any of the additional
safeguards that serve to justify dispensing with the warrant process and the intervention
of a neutral magistrate.453
Thus, even though the important governmental interest at stake is recognized, there
is uncertainty whether the objectives of this interest would be served by the NSA
surveillance.  Additionally, even if the surveillance did advance the purpose to some
extent, the scope of the intrusion coupled with the unbridled discretion of the executive
presents a program unlikely to pass Fourth Amendment muster.
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behind the search”).
See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (upholding a search to455
prevent the destruction of evidence of intoxication).
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623.456
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).457
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2002) (providing the Attorney General the ability to458
employ electronic surveillance in emergency situations for seventy-two hours with only
retroactive judicial approval); Camara, 387 U.S. at 533.
See S. REP. NO . 95–604, pt. 1, at 5 (1977), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3904,459
3906 (“The purpose of the bill is to provide a procedure under which the Attorney General
can obtain a judicial warrant authorizing the use of electronic surveillance in the United
States for foreign intelligence purposes.”).
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f); S. REP. NO . 95–701, at 57 (1978), as reprinted in 1978460
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3973, 4026.
See FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1805(f).461
See id.462
See id.463
B. Administrative Searches and the Impracticability of Warrants Approach
The second category of “special needs” cases recognized by the Supreme Court
entails circumstances in which obtaining a warrant would be impracticable.   These454
cases generally involve emergency situations in which obtaining a warrant would
result in the destruction of the evidence or in which unique circumstances exist that
counsel against the traditional warrant process.   Typical examples include the Skinner455
case, in which requiring a warrant to obtain drug tests after an accident would have
resulted in the loss of the evidence due to the body’s rapid elimination of alcohol,456
and T.L.O., in which requiring a school official, who was attempting to maintain school
rules and discipline, to first obtain a warrant would simply be impracticable.457
Despite its more forgiving requirements for permissible governmental purposes, the
“special needs” emergency exception does not justify the NSA surveillance because
a practical warrant process exists to address the particular needs of this surveillance.458
Congress passed FISA to provide a warrant process adapted to the sensitive and flexible
needs of electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence.   In addition, Congress included459
an emergency exception to this general warrant process to address situations in which
the Attorney General reasonably believes that the gravity and expediency of the need
prohibits prior judicial notification.   The emergency exception to FISA appears to460
address statutorily the “special needs” exception in the context of electronic surveil-
lance for foreign intelligence.   FISA allows for such an exception to apply but takes461
away discretion as to its scope and duration by placing statutory limits on them.462
The explicit FISA emergency exception suggests that no “special needs” exception
would be applicable to electronic surveillance in nonconformance with those limits.463
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nature of the tests and the minimal discretion vested in those charged with administering the
program, there are virtually no facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate.”).
United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977).471
See, e.g., United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 154 (2004) (expanding the472
scope of border searches to include the removal of gas tanks).
See id.473
The Bush administration admits that the warrantless NSA surveillance did not comply
with the requirements listed in FISA.   Thus, with a practical and obtainable warrant464
process, the justification for the surveillance based upon a “special needs” exception
would unduly expand the doctrine past its judicially constructed limits and divorce it
from the exigency that supports dispensing with the traditional warrant requirement.465
In addition, the Supreme Court has been willing to dispense with the warrant
requirement in these “special needs” situations because the existence of standardized
and discretionless criteria makes evaluation by a neutral magistrate unnecessary and
practically worthless.   For example, in Vernonia, the program at issue required466
drug testing for every student wishing to participate in athletics.   The procedures467
for gathering the urine and conducting the drug test were carefully limited to reduce
the intrusion and to reduce discretion.   The test results were distributed “only to468
a limited class of school personnel” and not otherwise used for internal school
discipline.   The Court found these standards sufficient to reduce the discretion of469
the officials to a degree in which no facts leading to suspicion would exist for a
neutral magistrate to evaluate.   There is no indication at this point that the warrantless470
NSA surveillance was conducted in such a discretion-less manner.  In fact, all indica-
tions appear to suggest that the program was administered based on individual
suspicion and not standardized criteria.
C. Administrative Border Searches
One last possible Fourth Amendment justification for the NSA searches would
be to compare them to administrative border searches. Historically, these searches
have been justified by the “longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself” from
dangerous people or things entering the country.   Since the attacks on September 11,471
the Supreme Court has shown a willingness to expand the scope of such searches.472
For example, the Court recently allowed for the total disassembly and detention for
nearly an hour of an automobile that sought to cross into the United States.473
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United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005) (upholding the search of the contents of
a computer at the border).
431 U.S. at 624–25.475
Id. at 624.476
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See id.478
See id. at 620.479
See id. at 620, 624.480
See generally Cole et al., supra note 115 (providing a letter to Congress signed by481
fourteen prominent constitutional law scholars and former government officials).
See generally DOJ WHITE PAPER, supra note 24.482
The argument to include the NSA surveillance as a border search would be that the
information is emanating from a foreign source and is crossing our borders reaching
computers here in the United States. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed
this particular issue, there is some support for this proposition.474
In 1977, in United States v. Ramsey, the Supreme Court upheld the opening of
eight envelopes at the international border.   The Court noted, however, that the475
search was limited to determining whether the envelopes contained something other
than correspondence.   The border officials were not allowed to read any correspon-476
dence that may have been inside the envelopes.477
The distinction drawn by the Court in Ramsey between items and correspondence
is critical and likely dispositive on the NSA surveillance issue.   The justification478
for the border search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign
to control “who and what may enter the country.”   Just as the “what” in Ramsey479
did not include the reading of correspondence, it also does not include correspon-
dence intercepted by electronic surveillance.480
CONCLUSION
The revelation of the warrantless electronic surveillance program conducted by the
Bush administration was met with criticism across a spectrum of the public.  The
general public, unfamiliar with the intricacies of FISA and the constitutional power
aspects of the issue, intuitively felt an abuse of power.  Constitutional scholars agreed
but were even more shocked by the clarity and brazen nature of the illegality.481
The Bush administration responded to the criticism with a comprehensive response
that argued every front of the gathering legal battle.   The comprehensive nature482
of the legal response, however, underscored the insincerity of the justifications prof-
fered because it implied an almost self-evident clarity to arguments that, at best, were
grasping for threads of authority.
Despite the numerous constitutional justifications provided by the President, the
argument for permissibility boils down to a reliance on the need to fight the “war on
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Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 238–39.
Id.; see also FISHER, supra note 290, at 205–08 (quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter, who485
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A Task Force on Domestic Surveillance in the Fight Against Terrorism was appointed487
by American Bar Association (ABA) President Michael S. Greco. The task force included
a former FBI director and former General Counsel to the CIA and NSA. The ABA House of
Delegates adopted the recommendations of the task force at the midyear meeting (Feb.
2006). One of the adopted recommendations states that the ABA is opposed to any electronic
surveillance inside the United States by the government “for foreign intelligence purposes
that does not comply with” FISA. ABAnet.org, Task Force on Domestic Surveillance in the
Fight Against Terrorism, http://www.abanet.org/op/domsurv (last visited Aug. 23, 2006).
Gareth Evans, President, Int’l Crisis Group, Lecture at the University of New South488
terrorism” through any means possible.   Opposing the exercise of this unchecked483
discretion over technology as powerful as the NSA yields does not require a finding
of poor motive by the President.  There is little doubt that the President genuinely feels
that the warrantless surveillance will help prevent additional attacks on the nation’s
homeland.  The point is that this determination is not his alone to make.
History is replete with examples of inflated executive claims for necessary restric-
tions on constitutional rights under threat of imminent danger.   Examples include the484
internment of Japanese-Americans, the summary military tribunal process and
execution of German saboteurs during World War II, and the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the Civil War.   In each of these cases, the nation and the Supreme485
Court abstained from restricting the immense power assumed by the President, and
these excesses are looked upon in retrospect through embarrassed and critical lenses.486
Yet, as if inevitable, a similar executive assertion of power surfaces once again.
Perhaps most shocking about the modern abuse is the similarity it shares with those
associated with former President Richard M. Nixon—experiences within the political
memory of the politicians and executive branch bureaucrats currently in power.  The
repetition of history’s mistakes is understandable, though still not pardonable, when
based upon ignorance of the past.  It is condemnable, however, to repeat mistakes based
on an arrogant refusal to learn from them.
Of course, there may be some truth to an argument that warrantless surveil-
lance will increase the government’s ability to protect against a terrorist attack.  It
is mere speculation to determine the operational effectiveness of bypassing a court
order process.  But even if there is some advantage, the real question is at what cost
is this advantage obtained.   Israel’s Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Aharon487
Barak, addressed and answered this same balancing of security and humanitarian
interests in 2004 when ordering the Israeli army to remove a portion of the West Bank
Security Wall due to its burden on the Palestinians.   Justice Barak’s words suggest488
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an acknowledgment that to win the war may be a Pyrrhic victory if individual
liberties are sacrificed in its wake:
We are aware that in the short term, this judgment will not make
the state’s struggle against those rising up against it any easier
. . . This is the destiny of a democracy:  she does not see all
means as acceptable, and the ways of her enemies are not always
open before her.  A democracy must sometimes fight with one
arm tied behind her back.  Even so, democracy has the upper
hand.  The rule of law and individual liberties constitute an
important aspect of her security stance.489
The Constitution, of course, is not a suicide pact,  but it does provide the wax and490
rope to block and bind the passions and fears of the moment.  If this nation is to sail
past the Sirens’ song of terrorism and fear, it must do so with renewed dedication
to our first principles and to the liberties and democratic ideals that make our society
worth the fight.
POSTSCRIPT
On July 26, 2006, the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings to consider
legislation that would deal with the NSA surveillance discussed in this article.491
General Michael Hayden, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, presented
legislation developed by Senator Arlen Specter, Chair of the Judiciary Committee,
and the President.   The proposal would allow the FISC to review the administration’s492
program of warrantless monitoring of international communication as opposed to
individual warrant and determine its constitutionality.   The Spector-White House493
proposal would rely on the President to seek voluntarily judicial review.  Further, if
review was denied, the President would have the right to appeal or resubmit the
proposal until such time as it receives approval by the FISC.  This procedure would
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eliminate the need to review individual warrants and would largely make the FISA
procedure, enacted almost thirty years ago, a nullity.494
This procedure is reminiscent of colonial times when custom officers armed with
writs of assistance could search anywhere they pleased.  These writs were issued with-
out probable cause, without any specificity with regard to things to be seized or places
to be searched, and were in effect until six months after the death of the reigning
monarch.  These writs provided the impetus for our founding ancestors as they devel-
oped the Fourth Amendment.   As a matter of fact, in the Massachusetts colonial495
court there was a petition by a customs officer for a new writ of assistance after the
death of King George II.  James Otis, appearing on behalf of the inhabitants of Boston,
made such an eloquent argument that it moved a young John Adams, one of the
signers of the Declaration of Independence, who described the argument fifty-six
years later as follows:  “Otis was a flame of Fire! . . . Then and there was the first scene
of the first Act of Opposition to the arbitrary Claims of Great Britain.  Then and
there the child Independence [sic] was born.”   The administration’s proposal is496
nothing more than a modern day writ of assistance.
On September 28, 2006, the United States House of Representatives by a vote
of 232 to 191 approved legislation that would give the President the power to order
wiretaps for up to ninety days without a court order.  The United States Senate is not
likely to address the bill until after the November election.   The Senate’s approach497
of submitting the entire surveillance program to the FISC or the House’s approach
of ninety days wiretaps without a court order present a clear signal of more
expansive presidential power to conduct warrantless surveillance of American
citizens.  How this legislation will affect or be affected by ongoing judicial review
of the warrantless surveillance program remains to be seen.498
